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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
LEW ISON, : Case No. 991030-CA 
Defendant/Appellant, 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for two counts of communication 
fraud, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-10-1801 
(1999). This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code Annotated 
section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002), which grants this Court jurisdiction over cases not 
involving a first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to the effective assistance of 
counsel. Defense counsel failed to (1) admit an administrative law judge's decision that 
exonerated Appellant, Lew Ison, of criminal conduct; (2) object to the prosecutor's 
failure to obtain an advance ruling before commenting on the failure to call an 
unavailable witness; (3) object to the trial judge's erroneous jury instruction that 
misstated the law; and, (4) secure Mr. Ison's right to be present during the consideration 
of a jury question. Did counsel's deficient representation alter the jury's guilty verdicts? 
Counsel is ineffective when counsel acts below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and the poor performance prejudices defendant. State v. Templin, 805 
P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). Criminal defendants may first challenge the effectiveness of 
counsel on appeal when the record supports counsel's misconduct and defendants are 
represented by new counsel. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ [16, 12 P.3d 92. 
2. This Court must reverse the convictions if the jury could not have reasonably 
found that, Appellant, Lew Ison, intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly misrepresented 
the truth. Mr. Ison, a licensed travel agent, requested more money from passengers on an 
ocean cruise based on his good faith belief that he had no contractual obligation to honor 
the original pricing for the cruise, another person had defrauded the passengers, and that 
without the additional funds the cruise line would cancel the entire group booking. Did 
the jury reasonably conclude that Mr. Ison misrepresented the need for more money? 
In reviewing cases for sufficient evidence, this Court defers to the jury verdict and 
will only reverse a conviction when reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime. State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 
(Utah 1994). Defense counsel requested the trial court for a dismissal of the charges 
2 
following the presentation of the State's case. R. 391: 441-42.] 
3. Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to timely object to an order 
imposing restitution for uncharged conduct without an agreement to pay for those acts? 
The same standards for Issue #1 apply to this issue. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 








TTtah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1999) 
S. Const. Amend. V 
.S. Const. Amend. VI 
Utah Const., article I, § 7 
Utah Const., article I, § 12 
Utah Rule Criminal Proc. 17(m) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On September 30, 1997, the Attorney General filed an Information charging Mr. 
Ison with two counts of communication fraud and two counts of fraudulent use of a 
financial transaction card number. R. 1. The financial card charges were unrelated to the 
present matter. The trial court conducted a preliminary hearing on July 14, 1998 and 
bound over Mr. Ison for trial on the communication fraud charges but found the evidence 
lacking for the financial card counts. R. 87. 
Volumes 389 through 392 include the trial transcripts. The envelope marked 338 
contains the presentence investigation report. Volume 393 contains the sentencing 
hearing transcript. The internal page numbers of those volumes are included after "R." 
and the volume number. 
The trial court conducted a jury trial from September 28, 1999 to October 1, 1999 
where a jury convicted Mr. Ison of both counts. R. 389-92. On November 29, 1999, the 
trial court sentenced Mr. Ison to two terms of up to five years each but suspended them, 
placed Mr. Ison on 36 months of probation, and ordered him to serve 30 days in jail. R. 
393: 3-4. The judge also imposed a $10,000 fine, suspended $8,000 of that amount, and 
ordered Mr. Ison to pay $3,717.55 in restitution. R. 393: 4. Mr. Ison filed a notice of 
appeal on December 3, 1999. R. 277. 
Defense counsel filed numerous post-judgment motions, including a motion for a 
hearing to challenge the restitution award. R. 313. The trial court never ruled on this 
motion. On February 24, 2000, Mr. Ison filed a motion for a stay of the judgement and a 
notice of intent to proceed pro se. R. 322-28. On February 22, 2001, this Court 
remanded this case to the trial court to determine whether Mr. Ison was indigent. R. 356. 
On April 10, 2001, the trial court appointed the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association to 
represent Mr. Ison on appeal. R. 362. 
On February 20, 2002, this Court stayed the briefing schedule pending the receipt 
of the preliminary hearing transcript and the Utah State Bar's ("USB") release of defense 
counsel's files. The USB had taken possession of defense counsel's files because 
counsel had been disbarred on January 10, 2002, and died the following day. The USB 
did not release defense counsel's case files until August of 2002. 
On September 18, 2002, Mr. Ison filed a motion under Utah Rule of Appellate 
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Procedure 23B. Mr. Ison requested a remand to the trial court for the entry of findin of 
fact not a taring in the record on appeal to support defense counsel's ineffectiveness. 
The State opposed the motion. This Court denied the motion on January 30, 2003. 
The facts underlying this case began in late 1994 when Aristocrat Travel of 
Bountiful, Utah signed a group cruise agreement with Norwegian Cruise Lines ("NCL'') 
for a Caribbean cruise scheduled for November 26, 1995. R. 391: 346; Addendum I. 
LaMar Lee Fiet owned Aristocrat and negotiated the agreement. R. 391: 373. Mr. Fiet 
contracted to sell 66 two-person cabins. R. 390: 191. Mr. Fiet's employee, John 
Lofthouse, was primarily responsible for booking the cruise and paying NCL the 
scheduled payments. R. 390: 189-90. 
To market the cruise aggressively, Mr. Fiet discounted NCL's listed prices which 
included a 17% commission for travel agents. R. 390: 194; Addendum I at 1. Travel 
agents were free to charge any price per passenger as long as NCL received its listed 
price minus the 17% commission. R. 390: 193-94. Mr. Fiet drastically lowered his 
commission to underprice his competition. R. 390: 201, 215-16; 391: 374-75, 379. NCL 
also offered travel agents a free cabin for every 15 cabins sold. R. 390: 192, 391: 270, 
300. Mr. Fiet used these cabins to sail free himself, offer to other agents or individuals 
who booked up at least 15 cabins, or sell the free cabins and spread out the savings 
among all passengers. R. 390: 199-201; 391: 271, 300; Addendum I at 2. 
NCL treated group cruises such as this one as a single contract requiring one total 
5 
funding level. R. 390: 221-22. NCL generally did not record passengers * names for 
group bookings nor did it differentiate between deposit money and money paid for the 
full cruise fare. Id. Rather, it established a payment schedule which required Aristocrat 
to pay $1,600 by December 15, 1994, and an additional $11,200 by July 27, 1995. 
Addendum I at 1. Before assigning cabins to passengers, the contract required a $200 
deposit for each passenger, or a total of $26,400, by August 28, 1995 (66 x 2 passengers 
per cabin x $200 = $26,400). Id at 1; R. 391: 343. The entire amount of the group 
cruise was due on September 25, 1995. Addendum I at 1. The group cruise contract 
provided that the entire group "will be automatically cancelled unless you contact us by 
the option date or if you fail to send the initial and/or second confirming deposit." Id,; R. 
390: 217-18. Despite this contractual right, NCL seldom cancelled entire groups and 
would normally reduce the number of cabins required to be sold to match the amount of 
money the travel agency had paid. R. 390: 203; 391: 273. 
Once the travel agency paid for the entire group and supplied NCL with 
passengers names, NCL would assign cabins to specific passengers. R. 390: 222; 391: 
291-92, 296-97. NCL left record-keeping of passenger payments and names to the travel 
agency who would gather money and forward the required payments by the due dates. R. 
390: 222; 391: 296-97. Usually, NCL would record passenger names for groups if 
passengers paid NCL directly by credit card. R. 391: 342-43. 
On January 19, 1995, NCL left a message for Mr. Lofthouse that demanded 
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$4,400 within a week or it would release 11 cabins for the group cruise. R. 391: 286; 
Ad .cndun at 1. On March 7, 1995. JL cancelled reservations for one category of 
cabins because it had not received the required deposits. R. 391: 288; Addendum J at 1-
2. Because of payments problems with Aristocrat, NCL instructed its service 
representatives to limit its lenienc Aristocrat's account. R. 391: 289; Addendum I 
at 2. On March 31, 1995, NCL redu^d the number of cabins required to be sold to 60 
because Aristocrat had no. *jaid the required deposits. R. 391: 291; Addendum J at 3. 
On June 30, 1995, although Aristocrat reported to NCL that it had sold 55 cabins, it still 
owed $9,000 to assign that number of rooms. R. 391: 292; Addendum J at 3. Because of 
Aristocrat's poor payment history, NCL assigned only 33 cabins pending receipt of the 
full deposit money. R. 391: 291-92; Addendum J at 3. 
NCL reviewed the group cruise account on July 25, 1995, and found that 
Aristocrat had paid for 53 cabins but still owed $7,400 for the group. R. 390: 220; 391: 
290. On August 4, 1995, NCL informed Mr. Lofthouse that the outstanding debt placed 
the group "in jeopardy" and threatened that Aristocrat needed to pay the full amount "to 
keep the cabins from canceling." R. 390: 220; Addendum J at 2. Although Mr. 
Lofthouse stated that he would send a check that day, NCL's accounting records indicate 
that Aristocrat did not send the promised check. Addendum J at 2; Addendum K at 4. 
During 1995, Mr. Ison negotiated with Mr. Fiet to buy Aristocrat's assets. R. 392: 
477-78. Mr. Ison owned a travel agency named Continental Travel. R. 392: 475. On 
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August 21, 1995, Mr. Ison entered into a purchase agreement with Mr. Fiet to buy 
furniture, Aristocrat's client lists and telephone numbers, and several group cruise 
bookings, including the November 26, 1995, cruise. R. 392: 479-81. The agreement 
provided that Mr. Ison acquired only the assets listed in the contract and none of 
Aristocrat's "liabilities." Addendum L at 1. Paragraph 15 of the agreement specifically 
conditioned the contract on Mr. Fiet's paying all deposit money to NCL: "On 
confirmation by Buyer [Mr. Ison] that all cruise and tour deposits have been paid to the 
cruise lines, tour operators, or received by Buyer, Buyer assumes all responsibility for the 
cruise and tour booking transferred to buyer." Addendum L at 6. 
The day after signing the purchase agreement, Mr. Ison entered Aristocrat's 
offices and discovered that much of the furniture, client lists, and business records were 
missing. R. 391: 448-49. Mr. Fiet had also failed to pay Aristocrat's telephone bill of 
over $3,000 which resulted in the loss of phone service. R. 391: 449-51, 378. 
The next day, Mr. Lofthouse informed Mr. Ison that Mr. Fiet had not forwarded 
adequate deposits to the cruise line for the group cruise. R. 390: 203; 392: 482, 489. 
Mr. Ison asked Mr. Lofthouse to complete an accounting of the payments for the cruise. 
R. 390: 204-05. The accounting revealed that although Aristocrat had received deposits 
for a number of cabins, Mr. Fiet had not forwarded all of the deposit money to NCL. R. 
390: 205, 219-20, 223; 392: 487-88; Addendum M. Because the business records were 
missing from the office, Mr. Lofthouse could not determine whose money Mr. Fiet had 
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forwarded or the amount some passengers had paid Mr. Fiet for the cruise. R. 390: 208-
12, 222-23; Addendum M. The accounting was also complicated because of NCL's 
practice of pooling group money into a single account and only recording passenger 
names if they paid NCL directly by credit card. R. 390: 221-22. 
Problems with Mr. Fiefs other business dealings with NCL affected the payments 
for the November 1995 cruise. On September 14, 1995, NCL transferred $2,919 and 
another $2,510 out of the group account to cover debts that Mr. Fiet had incurred on 
previous cruises. R. 391: 352-53, 358; Addendum K at 5. On that same day, NCL took 
another $4,796 out of the account because Mr. Fiefs bank had insufficient funds for a 
check in that amount which he had sent just before signing the purchase agreement with 
Mr. Ison. R. 391: 352; 392: 491; Addendum K at 5. 
About September 20, 1995, Mr. Ison demanded payment from Mr. Fiet for the 
unforwarded deposits, bounced check, and transferred funds. R. 392: 494, 517-18. Mr. 
Fiet refused. R. 392: 494. Mr. Ison consulted legal counsel and Mr. Lofthouse about his 
obligations for group cruise under the purchase agreement. R. 392: 496, 529-30. They 
all agreed that because Mr. Ison had not provided Mr. Fiet "confirmation . . . that all 
cruise and tour deposits have been paid to the cruise line[]ff as required under paragraph 
15 of the agreement, Mr. Ison had no contractual liability for the group cruise. R. 392: 
496, Addendum L at 6. Accordingly, on September 27, 1995, two days after the 
expiration of the deadline for paying NCL for lie entire group booking, Mr. Ison sent a 
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letter to Mr. Fiet informing him that he refused to assume responsibility for the group 
booking. R. 391: 384; 392: 517; Addendum N. 
Fearing the loss of Aristocrat's clientele and potential good will with its 
customers, Mr. Ison again consulted with Mr. Lofthouse and legal counsel. They agreed 
to contact the passengers and offer to "re-contract" with them to complete the group 
booking and to avoid cancellation of the entire group. R. 391: 453-55, 392: 496-97, 529-
32. To make up for the payments shortages, Mr. Ison used Mr. Lofthouse's accounting 
to determine how much each passenger had paid based on Aristocrat's existing records 
and NCL's credit card transactions. Mr. Ison then used NCL's full listed price, which 
included the 17% commission, as the amount each passenger would have to pay to 
contract with him to complete the cruise booking. R. 390: 212. 
Mr. Lofthouse prepared an offer letter to the passengers based on his accounting. 
R. 390: 202-03; 392: 551-52. Because of the lack of payment records, Mr. Lofthouse 
spread out the amount in the account evenly among all passengers. If the accounting 
showed that passengers had paid Mr. Fiet's original offer in full, the letter asked each 
passenger to pay an additional $115 per person. R. 389: 75-76. But, if the accounting 
did not indicate whether passengers had paid either Mr. Fiet or NCL, Mr. Ison required 
those persons to pay him the full cruise fare if they wanted him to assume responsibility 
for booking the cruise. R. 390: 212. 
Mr. Ison approved and signed the letter and then mailed it to the passengers on 
10 
October 11, 1995. R. 392: 498; Addendum 0. The letter provided that "all contracts, 
quotes, and commitments of Aristocrat Travel are null and void." Id. It explained further 
that "some of the monies that were paid to Aristocrat Travel were not forwarded." Id. 
Referring to Mr. Fiefs discount pricing, the letter stated "some of the prices quoted to 
you by Aristocrat Travel were not accurate." Id. Finally, the letter explained the need for 
extra payments because NCL "will not release any cruise documents to Continental 
Travel until all funds due [NCL] have been received by [NCL]." Id Mr. Ison prepared a 
second letter but it is not clear who, if anyone, received it. R. 390: 235-36; Addendum P. 
When many of the passengers demanded that Mr. Ison honor Mr. Fiet's original 
price, Mr. Ison agreed not to require more money from them. R. 389: 95; 392: 498-99. 
Mr. Ison refused, however, to book the cruise for several couples for whom he lacked 
documentation. R. 390: 212. If passengers refused to pay the amount shown on the 
accounting, he informed passengers to raise any disputes with Mr. Fiet. R. 392: 569. 
On October 24, 1995, Mr. Ison informed NCL that he was "charging [passengers] 
more money . . . and advised it['s] to make up for the difference [passengers] paid by 
cash." Addendum at J at 7. He also noted that he was requiring five couples to pay 
again. Addendum J at 7. Two couples had informed NCL that they would not pay again 
and wanted to cancel. Addendum J at 6-7. NCL had a record of them paying deposits of 
$200 per person, but because they paid Aristocrat the rest by check, NCL had pooled 
their payments with the entire group fund. Addendum J at 6. Mr. Ison informed NCL 
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that he was would give up his cabin that he had already paid for and then convert it into a 
four-person berth to allow the two couples to sail. R. 391: 301-02; Addendum J at 7-8. 
On October 27, 1995, Mr. Ison spoke with NCL's customer service representative, 
Allison Perez. R. 391: 303-04; Addendum J at 9. NCL's group sales manger, Ovido 
Mendez, had assigned Ms. Perez to handle the booking because of Aristocrat's funding 
problems. R. 391: 296, 308. Mr. Ison requested Ms. Perez to change passenger Douglas 
Shupe's cabin assignment to a category J cabin and to cancel the cabin Mr. Ison had 
purchased for himself. R. 391: 303; Addendum J at 9. Mr. Shupe and his wife had 
originally booked a more expensive cabin that included a hot tub. R. 389: 87-88. Mr. 
Fiet did not charge the Shupes even his discounted price for the more expensive cabin 
but apparently reduced the price as an accommodation for Mr. Shupe's recruitment of 
family and friends who had also booked the cruise. R. 389: 84-85, 108-09. 
The accounting showed that passengers Terry Millyard and Roberta Woodard 
owed over $1,000 because no records established that NCL had received that amount 
from them. R. 390: 210; 392: 556-57. Mr. Ison had a carbon copy of a check dated 
August 18, 1995, that Mr. Fiet sent to NCL for $1,000. R. 391: 322; 392: 555-56. The 
check included a notation that the payment was for Ms. Millyard's and June Field's 
cruise. Addendum Q. Ms. Woodard apparently later paid $500 to replace Ms. Field. 
NCL records indicated that it had credited the entire group account for $1,000 on August 
25, 1995, one week after Mr. Fiet had sent NCL the $1,000 check. R. 391:322; 
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Addendum K at 4. But, NCL's records do not indicate that this amount was specifically 
credited to Ms. Millyard and Ms. Woodard. R. 392: 555-58; Addendum K at 4. Rather, 
NCL simply deposited the check into the group account. Addendum K at 4. 
Based on his understanding that NCL had not credited passengers Millyard and 
Woodward, Mr. Ison personally contacted Ms. Woodward. R. 391: 456. Mr. Ison 
explained the problems with the shortages for the group booking and informed Ms. 
Woodard that he could not document that NCL had credited her and Ms. Millyard for the 
$1,000 payment. R. 391: 456. To secure her place on the cruise, Mr. Ison informed her 
that she and Ms. Woodward each needed to pay NCL $500. R. 391: 456-57. He 
suggested that she call NCL herself to verify the problem and then to pay NCL directly 
by credit card to ensure that NCL credited her for the payment. R. 391: 456-57. 
On October 30, 1995, Ms. Millyard called NCL and inquired about her account. 
R. 391: 304; Addendum J at 10. The next day, NCL received a credit card payment of 
$1,000 for Ms. Millyard and Ms. Woodard. Addendum K at 9. 
After receiving numerous calls from passengers, the Attorney General's Office 
and the Department of Commerce investigated complaints about the cruise. R. 171; 390: 
225. An investigator for the Attorney General interviewed Mr. Ison twice in November 
of 1995, before the group sailed. R. 390: 229-30, 232. The agent believed that Mr. Ison 
offered inconsistent answers about obtaining the passengers' consent to complete the 
booking and his offer to re-contract with them. R. 390: 233-36. When the investigator 
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asked about the request for additional money, Mr. Ison responded, "that difference 
between you and me is actually that commissionable income." R. 390: 242-43. 
In the meantime, the Utah Commerce Department's Division of Consumer 
Protection conducted an investigation. An administrative law judge ("ALJ") held a 
hearing on November 20, 1995 and found that prior to August 21, 1995, "Mr. Fiet 
became aware that insufficient funds had been paid to" NCL for the group booking and 
that those funds had been "diverted" prior to that date. R. 172, 176; Addendum R. The 
ALJ found further that Mr. Ison "had not been provided all of Aristocrat's business 
records as to readily document those funds which Aristocrat had received from the 
passengers in question." IcL Additionally, because Mr. Ison did not confirm to Mr. Fiet 
that the deposits had been paid as required under paragraph 15 of the purchase 
agreement, Mr. Ison never "assume[d] responsibility for the cruise and tour bookings in 
question." R. 173, 176. Moreover, the ALJ affirmatively stated that Mr. Ison "made no 
representations to any passenger" and committed no fraud R. 176. 
While these proceedings were taking place, Mr. Ison worked with the passengers 
and NCL to complete the group booking and cruise. To reduce the deficits, Mr. Ison 
claimed that he paid with his own credit card the $6,800 added to the group account on 
November 3, 1995. R. 391: 363-64, 459; 392: 501, 586-87; Addendum K at 9. NCL did 
not cancel the entire group, and, instead, booked only 41 cabins. R. 391: 313. 
The group sailed on November 25, 1995. R. 389: 66. At the time of departure, 
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NCL's accounts showed that the group had actually overpaid about $3,000, which 
normally would reflect a commissi R. 391:331,361. Just before the cruise, :ral 
passengers requested refunds but NCL did not process these requests until after the 
cruise sailed. Following the cruise, NCL processed the refunds which resulted in a 
deficit of $2,229.03. R. 391: 359-61, 371. Mr. Ison received no commission from NCL 
and, in fact, lost the $6,800 that he paid himself. R. 391: 371, 459; 392: 586-87. 
On October 16, 1996, the Attorney General charged Mr. Fiet with communication 
fraud and four counts of unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary. R. 164. In May 
of 1997, Mr. Fiet pleaded no contest to one misdemeanor count of attempted unlawful 
dealing and two felony counts of unlawful dealing. R. 143. The trial court convicted 
Mr. Fiet on July 15, 1997, and sentenced him to 30 days in jail, imposed 36 months of 
probation, and ordered him to pay $15,211 restitution to several passengers. R. 140-42. 
The State later charged Mr. Ison with two counts of communications fraud. R. 1. 
At a jury trial, the State's main theory was that Mr. Ison had recklessly disregarded the 
truth in his communications with passengers to obtain higher commissions. R. 392: 618-
21; 631-35, 655-60. Mr. Mendez, NCL's group sales manager, testified that he had little 
personal knowledge or recollection of the group cruise account; rather, the trial judge 
allowed him to interpret and recount the entries from NCL's telephone and accounting 
logs. R. 391: 275-77. Most of these communications were with Ms. Perez, who Mr. 
Mendez had assigned to handle the group cruise. R. 391: 284, 295-96, 308. At the time 
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of trial Ms. Perez had left NCL's employ and apparently was not available to testify. R. 
392: 580-81. Mr. Mendez testified that to the best of his knowledge NCL never 
threatened to cancel the entire group. R. 391: 328-29. Instead, NCL's records indicated 
that it had cancelled some cabin assignments to force Aristocrat and Mr. Ison to pay. Id. 
Mr. Fiet testified that he and Mr. Ison had numerous disputes over their purchase 
agreement, including who was responsible for the unpaid telephone bill. R. 391: 377-78, 
394-96. Initially, Mr. Fiet testified that he had forwarded to NCL all deposits for the 
group cruise as of the date of the purchase agreement. R. 391: 380. Later, he testified 
that he had "no idea" if he failed to pay NCL the required deposit money. R. 391: 412. 
Mr. Fiet reluctantly admitted that he had been convicted for defrauding passengers 
and had agreed to pay over $ 15,000 in restitution. R. 391: 390-91,411. He believed that 
he committed no criminal acts, but he pleaded no contest and agreed to pay aggrieved 
passengers following the Consumer Protection hearing and later in his plea agreement 
because he wanted to make them whole. R. 391: 390-91,411-13,417-18,430-31. Mr. 
Fiet accused Mr. Ison of bumping passengers from the cruise to "make more money." R. 
391: 421. Mr. Fiet refused to pay for the shortages because he claimed that Mr. Ison had 
"told me so many stories" that he did not trust him. R. 391: 428-29, 439. 
Mr. Ison testified that he had no intent to seek higher commissions from 
passengers. R. 392: 502, 538-39. Rather, when he learned that Mr. Fiet had not paid all 
of the required deposits, he concluded that the purchase agreement was void based on 
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paragraph 15 that required confirmation of those payments. R. 392: 529-32, 574. Both 
Mr. Lofthouse and a legal advisor agreed with this assessment. R. 392: 529-32. He also 
relied on NCL's representations that shortages existed and on Mr. Lofthouse's 
accounting supporting this fact. R. 392: 487-91. According to Mr. Ison, Ms. Perez of 
NCL had threatened to cancel the entire cruise and refused to release cruise tickets unless 
he paid the outstanding balance for the group. R. 392: 546, 580-81. Mr. Ison asserted 
that he acted in good faith and that his main goal was to secure the voyage for as many 
passengers as possible while fairly distributing the burden of the missing money among 
all passengers given the lack of documentation. R. 392: 502, 538-39. 
On cross-examination, the prosecutor doubted that Ms. Perez threatened to cancel 
the group cruise and asked Mr. Ison, "And, Allison Perez did not come and testify here 
today - or in this trial; is that correct?" R. 392: 546. Mr. Ison conceded Ms. Perez's 
absence. Id. Later, Mr. Ison testified that Ms. Perez had refused to assume responsibility 
for the five couples for whom there were no payments records. R. 392: 580. The 
prosecutor instructed Mr. Ison, "I'll ask you not to respond to anything that Alison [sic] 
Perez told you. . . . I mean, she was not hear to testify. She no longer works for the 
company. . . ." R. 392: 580. The trial judge sustained defense counsel's objection to the 
prosecutor's comments about Ms. Perez working for NCL. R. 392: 580-81. 
In closing statements, the prosecutor contended that Mr. Ison either intentionally 
misrepresented the facts in his communications with passengers or that he acted with 
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reckless disregard for the truth to obtain higher commissions for himself. R. 392: 632-
35. The prosecutor also faulted Mr. Ison for not calling Ms. Perez to testify to support 
his claims that NCL had threatened to cancel the entire group booking: 
Now, you've got the statement of Mr. Ison that 
somebody who didn't come and testify today said, oh yeah 
we're going to cancel the entire group. Well, that's Mr. Ison's 
statement. And I -1 submit to you that you ought not to look at 
the credibility of that statement at this point. Because what we 
have are the people from [NCL] who did come and testify, no, 
you know, we were just going to cancel certain cabins We 
let them take those cabins and they went on the cruise and the 
rest of them we cancelled. They didn't cancel the whole group. 
R. 392:621-22. 
During jury deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial judge referring to the 
purchase agreement between Mr. Ison and Mr. Fiet. The note read, "Is this a legal and 
binding contract during the time of the alledged [sic] offense?" R. 231. Instead of 
placing the note on the trial transcript, the trial judge included a photo copy of the note in 
the record with the trial judge's response, "Yes" and his signature. R. 231; 392: 666. 
The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts of communication fraud. R. 240-41. 
In sentencing Mr. Ison, the trial judge awarded $500 in restitution to Mr. Shupe 
who received a less expensive cabin than the one he originally booked. R. 338: 
Restitution Schedule. The judge also awarded $773.55 to a travel agent named Patricia 
Burback who claimed that Mr. Ison failed to pay her commissions for passengers she 
booked on the cruise. Id; R. 390: 174. This appeal followed. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defense counsel's deficient representation directly resulted in the jury's guilty 
verdicts. Defense counsel failed to present an administrative agency's decision that 
confirmed Mr. Ison's good faith beliefs and that he made no misrepresentations to 
passengers. Altlv this evidence was admissible under Utah law, counsel never even 
attempted to admit it. Because this evidence established that Mr. Ison acted in good 
faith, defense counsel's conduct directly affectea the outcome of this case. 
Defense counsel further prejudiced the defense in failing to obtain an advance 
ruling before com jnting on the failure to present wi? ses. Without seeking the 
required court per nssion, the prosecutor blamed Mr. Ison for not calling Ms. Perez in 
support of the defense theory. Because Ms. Perez was not available, the prosecutor's 
comments were improper. Defense counsel's failure to object undermines the validity of 
the jury's verdicts because the prosecutor's comments struck at the heart of Mr. Ison's 
defense that NCL had threatened to cancel the entire group cruise. 
Defense counsel's poor representation further affected the jury's verdicts by not 
objecting to the trial judge's erroneous jury instruction that the purchase agreement 
between Mr. Ison ana Mr. Fiet was binding. As matter of law, Mr. Ison never assumed 
responsibility for the group cruise. But, because defense counsel failed to object, the trial 
judge's instruction informed the jury that Mr. Ison had misrepresented that he had no 
contractual duty to honor the original prices for the cm 
19 
Defense counsel's failure to object also violated Mr. Ison's state constitutional 
right to be present in court when the trial judge considers jury questions. Mr. Ison's 
presence was essential to correcting the trial judge's erroneous conclusion that the 
purchase agreement was valid. Mr. Ison could have corrected this error and ensured that 
the jury was properly instructed that the purchase agreement was not binding. In any 
event, defense counsel's inadequate representation constitutes cumulative error. 
Further, the State failed to present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable 
jury could conclude that Mr. Ison intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly misrepresented 
the truth. Mr. Ison accurately claimed that his purchase agreement with Mr. Fiet was 
void because he never confirmed that Mr. Fiet had forwarded deposits as a condition 
precedent under that agreement. The facts support that Mr. Fiet did not send NCL 
adequate deposit money and that Mr. Ison reasonably relied on that fact in his 
communications. Because Mr. Ison had no contractual obligation to the passengers and 
given Mr. Fiet's discount pricing, Mr. Ison truthfully stated that Aristocrat's prices were 
not accurate. The State also failed to prove that Mr. Ison even acted recklessly in 
warning passengers that NCL had power to cancel the entire group cruise. Finally, Mr. 
Ison truthfully advised Ms. Woodward to contact NCL directly and then pay $1,000 by 
credit card because neither he nor NCL could document that she had been credited for 
paying that amount. Given Mr. Ison's absence of any criminal intent, this Court should 
reverse Mr. Ison's convictions for lack of evidence. 
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Finally, defense counsel failed to timely object to an unlawful restitution award. 
The trial jud * imposed restitution for acts of which Mr. Ison was not convicted and for 
which he never agreed to pay restitution. Defense counsel's failure to object resulted in 
Mr. Ison paying for conduct that was not at issue in this prosecution. 
ARGUMENT 
Defense counsel provided deficient representation in failing to: (1) admit public 
records proving Mr. Ison's innocence; (2) object to the prosecutor's failure to obtain an 
advance ruling on the defense's failure to call witnesses; (3) object to an erroneous 
response to a jury question that misstated the law; and, (4) secure Mr. Ison's 
constitutional right to presence at trial. These errors individually and cumulatively 
directly resulted in the guilty verdicts and deprived Mr. Ison of a fair trial. Moreover, the 
State failed to present sufficient evidence that Mr. Ison had any criminal intent. Finally, 
defense counsel failed to timely object to an unlawful restitution award. 
I. DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR 
FAILING TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF APPELLANT'S 
INNOCENCE, OBJECTING TO ERRORS OF LAW, AND 
ESSENTIALLY CONCEDING APPELLANT'S GUILT 
TO THE JURY 
This court should grant Mr. Ison a new trial because defense counsel provided 
ineffective assistance. Defense counsel failed to admit into evidence a decision from an 
administrative law judge that concluded that Mr. Ison had not defrauded passengers and 
that Mr. Fiet was actually at fault for the shortages. Counsel also failed to object to the 
21 
prosecutor's failure to obtain an advance ruling on comments about Mr. Ison's failure to 
present a witness. He further neglected to object to the trial judge's erroneous 
supplemental jury instruction that the purchase agreement between Mr. Ison and Mr. Fiet 
was binding. Moreover, defense counsel's failure to secure Mr. Ison's right to be present 
during the consideration of this question, prevented Mr. Ison from informing the trial 
judge that he had legally rescinded the agreement. Because counsel's deficient 
performance directly resulted in Mr. Ison's convictions and the cumulative effect of these 
errors deprived Mr. Ison of a fair trial, a new trial is needed. 
When criminal defendants claim that counsel was ineffective on direct appeal, 
they must be represented by new counsel and they "bear[] the burden of assuring the 
record is adequate" State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^|16, 12 P.3d 92. Defense counsel 
is ineffective when counsel acts below an objective standard of reasonableness and the 
deficient performance prejudices the defendant. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 
(Utah 1990). Prejudice requires criminal defendants to show "'that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.'" Id. at 187 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). Defense counsel's errors here undermined the defense theory 
and allowed the jury to consider improper evidence that directly resulted in conviction. 
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A. Defense Counsel Failed to Present Public 
Records Showing that Mr. Ison Made No 
Misrepresentations 
Defense counsel failed to present known evidence that the Consumer Protection 
Division confirmed Mr. Ison's good faith beliefs and that he made no misrepresentations 
to passengers. Despite being aware of this exculpatory evidence, defense counsel never 
attempted to admit it. The agency decision exonerating Mr. Ison was admissible under 
the Rules of Evidence and would have established Mr. Ison's innocence. 
Directly undermining the State's theory, the ALJ found that Mr. Fiet had 
knowingly failed to forward sufficient funds to NCL. R. 172, 176. The ALJ faulted Mr. 
Fiet for not providing Mr. Ison all of Aristocrat's business records. IdL Because Mr. Ison 
did not confirm to Mr. Fiet that the deposits had been paid as required under paragraph 
15 of the purchase agreement, Mr. Ison never "assume[d] responsibility for the cruise and 
tour bookings in question." R. 173, 176. Finally, the ALJ affirmatively stated that Mr. 
Ison "made no [misrepresentations to any passenger" and committed no fraud R. 176. 
Despite these exculpatory findings, defense counsel never sought to admit them. 
Defense counsel was aware of the administrative proceedings because he specifically 
asked Mr. Fiet several questions about testifying at the administrative hearing. R. 391: 
411-13, 417-18, 430-31. An official copy of the ALJ's findings and conclusions also 
appears in the trial court record. R. 170-77. 
Had trial counsel sought to admit the ALJ's decision, the trial court likely would 
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have admitted it because that decision was relevant to proving the defense. Evidence is 
relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence 
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would without 
the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. The ALJ's decision directly contradicted the State's 
theory of an intent to defraud and supported Mr. Ison's innocence. 
The ALJ's decision was also admissible under the public records exception to the 
hearsay rule. That exception allows for the admission of ,f[r]ecords, reports, statements, 
or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth . . . (C) in 
civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual 
findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, 
unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness." Utah R. Evid. 803(8). "For documents to be admissible under 803(8), 
the preparer must be a public official who made the report within the scope of his or her 
duty." State ex rel.W.S., 939 P.2d 196, 200 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
An ALJ's decision following an investigation comprises an agency decision under 
Rule 803(8). Zeus Enterprises v. Alphin Aircraft. Inc.. 190 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 1998); 
Larsen v. Decker, 995 P.2d 281, 283-85 (Ariz. Ct App. 2000). Such decisions constitute 
"factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by 
law.. .." Utah R. Evid. 803(8). Thus, the ALJ's decision was admissible under Rule 
803(8). Cooper v. Carl A. Nelson & Co.. 211 F.3d 1008, 1018 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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Defense counsel's failure to admit the ALJ's decision constituted deficient 
performance because there was "no conceivable strategic reason for defense counsel to 
consciously avoid" admitting the decision. State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 941 (Utah 
1996). In evaluating defense counsel's effectiveness, this Court ,f'give[s] trial counsel 
wide latitude in making tactical decisions and will not question such decisions unless 
there is no reasonable basis supporting them.'" State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283, 293 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted). Because the ALJ's decision served only to 
bolster the defense theory that Mr. Ison acted in good faith, there was no possible 
strategic reason for defense counsel not to seek its admission. Labrum, 925 P.2d at 941. 
Defense counsel's failure to admit the ALJ's decision also undermines confidence 
in the jury's verdict. Templin, 805 P.2d at 187. As the prosecutor conceded at trial, the 
sole issue for the jury's determination was Mr. Ison's intent in representing why he 
needed more money. R. 392: 618-21; 631-35, 655-60. According to the prosecutor, Mr. 
Ison intentionally misrepresented the facts or recklessly disregarded the truth in an effort 
to gain higher commissions for the group booking. The ALJ's decision undercuts this 
theory and supports Mr. Ison's innocence in requesting more funds. Specifically, the 
decision supports the defense theory that: (1) Mr. Fiet had not forwarded deposit money 
for the cruise; (2) documentation was lacking for passenger payments; (3) Mr. Ison had 
rescinded the purchase agreement; (4) he was not contractually bound to complete the 
booking; and, (5) sufficient funds were lacking to pay for the cruise. 
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These facts fully supported Mr. Ison's testimony that he feared that unless he 
raised more money NCL would invoke the group cruise contract and cancel some if not 
all of the bookings. "[CJounsel may be deemed ineffective for failure to present 
exculpatory evidence of which he is aware." People v. Roberts, 743 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 
(111. App. Ct. 2000). Defense counsel's failure to present persuasive exculpatory 
evidence on the only issue for the jury to decide, directly undermines confidence in the 
jury's verdict. Templin, 805 P.2d at 187. 
B. Defense Counsel Prejudiced the Jury By 
Failing to Object to the Prosecutor Not 
Obtaining an Advance Ruling on the Defense's 
Failure to Call a Witness As Required By Law 
Utah law required the prosecutor to obtain an advance ruling before commenting 
on the defense's failure to call Ms. Perez to testify. Although the prosecutor failed to 
obtain an advance ruling, defense counsel did not object when the prosecutor faulted Mr. 
Ison for not calling Ms. Perez. Because Ms. Perez was not available, the prosecutor's 
comments were improper. Defense counsel's failure to object undermines the validity of 
the jury's verdicts because the prosecutor's comments struck at the heart of the alleged 
misrepresentations in this close case. 
Defense counsel had solid grounds for objecting to the prosecutor's comments. 
Prosecutors may not comment on "matters the jury would not be justified in considering" 
such as the failure to call witnesses absent an advanced ruling from the trial court. State 
v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 804 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Under the missing witness rule, "'if a 
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party has it peculiarly within his power to produce witnesses whose testimony would 
elucidate the transaction e fact that he does r do it permits an inference that the 
testimony, if produced, would have been unfavorable.'" State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052, 
1057 (Utah 1985) (quoting United States v. Young. 463 F.2d 934, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). 
The proponent of the inference has the burden of showing that "'the witness is physically 
available only to the opponent, or [] the witness has the type of relationship with the 
opposing party that pragmatically renders his testimony unavailable to the opposing 
party.'" Id. at 1058 (quoting Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine v. George A. 
Fuller. Co.. 719 F.2d 1335, 1353 (7th Cir. 1983)). But, to avoid prejudice, parties seeking 
to comment on the failure to call witnesses must obtain '"an advance ruling from the trial 
court'" before making such arguments. State v. Thompson, 776 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1989) 
(quoting Gass v. United States. 416 F.2d 767, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1969)). 
The prosecutor below never sought an advance ruling before arguing that Mr. Ison 
failed to present Ms. Perez's testimony in support of his defense. In stead, during closing 
arguments, the prosecutor blamed Mr. Ison for not calling Ms. Perez to testify: 
Now, you've got the statement of Mr. Ison that 
somebody who didn't come and testify today said, oh yeah 
we're going to cancel the entire group. Well, that's Mr. Ison's 
statement. And I -1 submit to you that you ought not to look at 
the credibility of that statement at this point. Because what we 
have are the people from [NCL] who did come and testify, no, 
you know, we were just going to cancel certain cabins We 
let them take those cabins and they went on the cruise and the 
rest of them we cancelled. They didn't cancel the whole group. 
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R. 392:621-22. 
Had defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's failure to obtain an advance 
ruling, the trial judge would have barred the prosecutor's comments because Ms. Perez 
was not available. The prosecutor conceded at trial that Ms. Perez was unavailable 
because she no longer worked for NCL. R. 392: 580. Thus, the prosecutor could not 
show that Ms. Perez was '"physically available only to the opponent, or [] the witness has 
the type of relationship with the opposing party that pragmatically renders his [or her] 
testimony unavailable to the opposing party.'11 Smith, 706 P.2d at 1058 (quoting 
Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine, 719 F.2d at 1353). 
f![N]o reasonable basis" or strategy supported failing to object. Finlavson, 956 
P.2d at 293. Objecting posed no risk of further highlighting the comments because the 
prosecutor explicitly faulted Mr. Ison for not proving his defense through Ms. Perez's 
testimony, thus giving the jury the clear impression that Mr. Ison had a duty to present 
Ms. Perez. Given the absence of an advance ruling and Ms. Perez's unavailability, 
defense counsel had nothing to lose by objecting and, at the very least, obtaining a 
curative instruction from the trial judge. State v. Kohl 2000 UT 35, Tf24, 999 P.2d 7 
(discussing mitigating effect of curative instructions). In fact, because the law was 
"clear" on missing witness arguments, the trial judge should have excluded the 
comments himself. State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19,1fl8, 18 P.3d 1123. 
This omission also prejudiced the jury's verdict because NCL's communications 
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to Mr. Ison formed the essence of the State's claim that Mr. Ison had no basis for 
informing passengers in his October 115 19^5 letter that NCL"will not release any cruise 
documents to Continental Travel until all funds due [NCL] have been received by 
[NCL]." Addendum O. As explained above, the only evidence supporting the absence 
of threats was Mr. Mendez's interpretation of NCL's telephone logs. Id. But, in contrast 
to Mr. Mendez's second-hand knowledge, Mr. Ison personally communicated with Ms. 
Perez and had personal knowledge of those communications. Consistent with Mr. Ison's 
testimony, NCL infor i Mr. Lofthouse to pay $7,400 "to keep the [cabins] from 
cancelling" and to avoid placing the cruise "in jeopardy." Addendum J at 2; R. 390: 220. 
Although NCL was flexible with Mr. Ison, NCL's records do not exclude that Ms. Perez 
made the threats. In fact, this court should not rely too heavily on NCL's telephone logs 
because Mr. Mendez testified that NCL employees often kept poor records. R. 391: 290. 
The prosecutor's comments on failing to call Ms. Perez left the jury with the 
incorrect impression that Ms. Perez's absence undermined Mr. Ison's representation that 
cancellation was a real possibility. In determining the effect prosecutorial comments 
have on the jury, this court must look to the entire proceedings to determine if the 
comments affected the fairness of the trial. Baker, 963 P.2d at 840. Here, the 
prosecutor's comments must be considered together with her implications during her 
cross-examination of Mr. Ison that Mr. Ison lied because "Allison Perez did not come 
and testify here today - or in this trial. . . ." R. 392: 546. Later, the prosecutor instructed 
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Mr. Ison. "I'll ask you not to respond to anything that Alison [sic] Perez told you. . . . I 
mean, she was not hear to testify. She no longer works for the company. . . . " R. 392: 
580. Although the trial judge sustained defense counsel's objection to this comment, the 
objection was limited to whether Ms. Perez still worked for NCL. R. 392: 580-81. The 
obvious implication of these questions was that Mr. Ison was lying, otherwise, he would 
have presented Ms. Perez's testimony. 
Because the prosecutor's comments undermined Mr. Ison's claims that he 
truthfully represented that NCL had threatened to cancel the entire group, those 
comments prejudiced the jury's assessment of Mr. Ison's statements. Improper 
comments on the failure to call witnesses require reversal when the defendant shows that 
"'the jurors were probably influenced by the improper remarks in reaching their 
verdict.'" Thompson, 776 P.2d at 50 (quoting State v. Andreason. 718 P.2d 400, 402 
(Utah 1986)). In this case, the prosecutor's argument that Mr. Ison was lying and could 
not support his defense influenced the jury to conclude that Mr. Ison falsely claimed that 
NCL could cancel the cruise. Moreover, given this prejudice and that the law was clear 
that the prosecutor's comments were improper, the trial judge plainly erred in not 
excluding the comments. State v. Helmick, 2000 UT 70, TJ9, 9 P.3d 164. Mr. Ison 
requests this Court to remand this matter for a new trial to afford him his right to 
effective assistance of counsel. 
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C. Defense Counsel's Failure to Object to a 
Legally Erroneous Jurv Instruction About the 
Validity of the Purchase Agreement Caused 
the Jury to Convict Appellant 
Defense counsel further prejudiced the defense in not objecting to the trial judge's 
erroneous jury instruction that the purchase agreement between Mr. Ison and Mr. Fiet 
was binding. As a matter of law, Mr. Ison had rescinded any obligation to assume 
responsibility over the group cruise and he truthfully informed the passengers that he had 
no contractual obligation to them. Because defense counsel failed to object, the trial 
judge's incorrect instruction informed the jury that Mr. Ison had misrepresented that he 
had no contractual dutv to honor the original prices for the cruise. 
The trial judge's supplemental jury instruction that the contract between Mr. Ison 
and Mr. Fiet was "legal and binding" incorrectly stated the law. R. 231. Whether two 
parties have formed a contract presents a question of law for the trial judge. Nunley v. 
Westates Casing Services. Inc , 1999 UT 100, TJ17, 989 P.2d 1077. When a contract 
contains a condition precedent, the contract does not become binding "until that 
condition occurs or exists." Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council Inc.. 1999 UT 34, ^fl4, 
976 P.2d 1213. "Failure of a material condition precedent relieves the obligor of any duty 
to perform." Id. 
Mr. Ison never assumed responsibility for the group cruise because the parties did 
not satisfy the condition in Paragraph 15 of the purchase agreement. That paragraph 
specifically stated that Mr. Ison was only contractually bound to complete the group 
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booking once he gave Mr. Fiet "confirmation . . . that all cruise and tour deposits have 
been paid." Addendum L at 6. Mr. Ison could not confirm that Mr. Fiet paid the 
deposits. In fact, Mr. Ison specifically informed Mr. Fiet by letter that he had rescinded 
the agreement to complete the group booking. Addendum N. Thus, the trial judge erred 
in instructing the jury that the contract was binding on Mr. Ison. 
Despite the failure of this condition precedent, defense counsel did not object to 
the erroneous jury instruction. Trial judges have a duty to correctly instruct the jury on 
the law. State v.Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256,1J22, 56 P.3d 969. No tactical reason 
supported the failure to object because the efficacy of the purchase agreement was vital 
to the truthfulness of Mr. Ison's claim that uall contracts, quotes, and commitments of 
Aristocrat Travel are null and void." Addendum F. Because "no conceivable strategic 
reason" justified allowing the trial judge to misstate the law, defense counsel's failure to 
point out the trial court's error was unreasonable. Labrum, 925 P.2d at 941. 
Defense counsel's failure to object also undermines confidence in the jury's 
verdict because the trial judge's instruction informed the jury that Mr. Ison 
misrepresented the facts when he denied he was bound to Aristrocrat. Instead, the failure 
of the condition precedent relieved Mr. Ison of any contractual obligations to the 
passengers. Had defense counsel objected to the false instruction, he could have 
explained to the trial judge that the contract was not binding and that Mr. Ison truthfully 
represented the situation. 
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The trial judge's instruction also implicitly informed the jury that Mr. Ison lied 
when he claimed that Mr. Fiet ha^  lot forwarded all deposits. Because the validity of the 
purchase agreement was contingent upon Mr. Fiet forwarding all deposits, the trial judge 
impliedly informed the jury that Mr. Fiet had forwarded the required sums by stating that 
the contract was valid. The trial judge's erroneous instruction mistakei v decided the 
verdicts for the jury. Because defense counsel's failure to object directly led to the jury's 
guilty verdicts, defense counsel was ineffective. Templin, 805 P.2d at 186-87. 
D. b *ense Counsel's Mishandling of the Jury 
Instruction Deprived Appellant of His State 
Constitutional Right to Be Present at Trial 
Mr. Ison had a state constitutional right to be present in court when the trial judge 
considered the contents of the jury's question. Nevertheless, defense counsel never 
objected to the trial judge's failure to review the jury question in Mr. Ison's presence or 
to place the jury's question on the trial transcript. Had defense counsel invoked Mr. 
Ison's right to presence, Mr. Ison could have informed defense counsel and the trial 
judge that the purchase agreement was not binding. 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution establishes a right for criminal 
defendants "to appear and defend in person." This right extends to the trial judge's 
consideration of jury questions sent to the judge during deliberations. The Utah Supreme 
Court ruled in State v. Lee, 585 P.2d 58, 58 (Utah 1978), that "constitutionally and 
statutorily and case-wide defendant has a right to be present at all stages of the trial, - and 
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a duty as well: and that any communication between judge and jury should be in the 
presence of the accused, his [or her] counsel and the prosecutor." (footnotes omitted). 
The trial judge never considered the jury question in Mr. Ison's presence. Rather, 
the record simply contains a photo copy of the trial judge's affirmative written response 
to the jury's question. R. 231. Lee. plainly prohibits the trial judge from communicating 
with the jury in this manner. 585 P.2d at 58. 
Although the law since Lee appears to be inconsistent, no case has overruled that 
case or eliminated the constitutional right to appear in court during judge and jury 
communications. Following Lee, the legislature amended the statute addressing jury 
questions sent to judges during deliberations. The former statute had required the trial 
judge to bring the jury into the courtroom and address the question "in the presence of, or 
after notice to, the prosecuting attorney and the defendant or his counsel." Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-32-2 (1976). Two years after Lee was decided, the legislature amended this 
provision on jury questions: 
After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be 
informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall 
inform the officer in charge of them, who shall communicate 
such request to the court. The court may then direct that the 
jury be brought before the court where, in the presence of the 
defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the 
inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be 
given. Such response shall be recorded. The court may in its 
discretion respond to the inquiry in writing without having the 
jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and the 
response thereto shall be entered in the record. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-17(m) (1982). In 1989, the legislature repealed the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and the Utah Supreme Court adopted them as court rules. Utah Code 
Ann. Chapter 77-35 (Supp. 1990). The Supreme Court designated the statute quoted 
above as Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(m). 
Only two Utah cases have addressed the right to be present during jury questions 
following Lee and after the legislature and the Utah Supreme Court adopted Rule 17(m). 
In State v. Kozik, 688 P.2d 459, 460 (Utah 1984), the jury sent the trial judge a note 
asking about the effect of a hung jury on one count would have on the remaining counts 
of theft. The trial judge called the jury back to the courtroom, advised both counsel and 
the defendant of the content of the note, and then instructed the jury that they were 
obligated to reach a verdict on all counts based on the instructions already given. Id. 
The defendant complained that Rule 17(m) required the trial judge to reveal to the parties 
the contents of a jury note before bringing the jury to the courtroom. IcL The Supreme 
Court found no error because the jury's question addressed a point of law for the judge to 
decide and, in any event, the judge entered the note onto the trial court record in 
accordance with Rule 17(m). IcL at 461. The court reasoned that even if error occurred, 
the error was harmless. IcL The Supreme Court failed to even mention Lee. 
In State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the trial judge answered a 
jury question while counsel and the defendant were outside the court building. The 
judge later brought counsel and the defendant into the courtroom and placed his actions 
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on the record. IcL The defendant argued that Rule 17(m) required the trial judge to 
consult with counsel and the defendant before communicating with the jury. IcL This 
Court ruled that Rule 17(m) allows trial judges to communicate with the jury outside the 
defendant's presence if judges "enter the question and answer into the record, giving 
counsel opportunity to object to the instruction." IcL at 4. Because the trial judge 
followed this procedure, this Court found that no error had occurred. Again, this Court 
never mentioned Lee. 
Several principles derive from this history. First, Lee remains sound law and 
establishes a constitutional right to be present when the trial judge communicates with 
the jury. Second, both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have never addressed the 
constitutionality of Rule 17(m) in light of Lee. Third, Kozik and Lucero both hold that 
although trial judges need not reveal the contents of a jury note to counsel or the 
defendant beforehand, they must record the note on the record and bring counsel and the 
defendant into the courtroom to provide them an "opportunity to object to the 
instruction." Lucero, 866 P.2d at 4. 
Under any of these scenarios, the trial judge violated Mr. Ison's right to appear in 
court. Under Lee, Mr. Ison had a constitutional right to be present when the trial judge 
considered the jury's question. Moreover, even assuming that Rule 17(m) satisfies state 
constitutional scrutiny, the trial judge failed to bring defense counsel and Mr. Ison into 
court to give them an opportunity to place any objections on the record. 
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Defense counsel's acquiescence to the trial judge's actions constitutes deficient 
performance since it deprived Mr. Ison of his n j i t to be present under Lee . Mr. Ison's 
presence was essential to allow him to inform defense counsel or the trial judge that he 
was not legally bound to assume responsibility for the group cruise. Mr. Ison has 
consistently maintained from his discovery of the shortages throughout this appeal that 
he was not contractually bound to complete the group booking. But, without him being 
present in court, he had no opportunity to assist his counsel in asserting this contention. 
Defense counsel's failure to secure Mr. Ison's right to presence also directly 
influenced the jury to convict Mr. Ison. As explained in section IC, the trial judge 
erroneously concluded that Mr. Ison was bound under the purchase agreement. This 
conclusion informed the jury that Mr. Ison was not truthful when he claimed that he had 
no contractual obligation to the passengers. It also communicated to the jury that Mr. 
Fiet had paid the deposits to NCL contrary to the actual facts of the case. Because Mr. 
Ison could have corrected the trial judge's faulty assumptions, defense counsel's failure 
to secure Mr. Ison's presence led to his convictions. 
E. Defense Counsel's Cumulative Errors Require 
Reversal 
Even if defense counsel's individual misdeeds did not prejudice Mr. Ison, the 
cumulative effect of those errors requires a new trial. "The doctrine of cumulative error 
allows for a new trial when standing alone, no error is severe enough to warrant a new 
trial, but when considered together, the errors denied the defendant a fair trial." State v. 
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Young. 853 P.2d 327, 368 (Utah 1993). Here, defense counsel failed to present 
exculpatory evidence and object to the admission of damaging evidence. As explained in 
section II below, this case was close and turned on Mr. Ison's good faith beliefs, 
interpreting inconclusive evidence, and the prosecutor's claim that Mr. Ison sought 
higher commissions. Had defense counsel adequately represented Mr. Ison, the jury 
likely would have had the grounds it needed to acquit Mr. Ison. 
II. THE STATE PRESENTED INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
BECAUSE APPELLANT ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND 
ACCURATELY REPRESENTED THE FACTS 
The evidence presented at trial failed to prove any criminal intent. Rather, Mr. 
Ison's representations in the October 11, 1995 and to Ms. Millyard were truthful and 
made in good faith. Because a reasonable jury could not have convicted Mr. Ison, this 
Court should reverse Mr. Ison's convictions for lack of evidence. 
In reviewing cases for sufficient evidence, this Court affords great deference to 
the jury verdict. State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). It will only reverse a 
conviction when reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime. Id When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting a jury verdict, the appellant "must marshal the evidence in support of the 
verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict." State v. Hopkins. 1999 UT 98, ^ 14, 989 P.2d 1065. 
Because Mr. Ison admitted making the statements in the letter and to Ms. 
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Woodward, the only real question for the jury was Mr. Ison's knowledge and intent at the 
time he made those statements. Communications fraud occurs when "the pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or omitted 
intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth." Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-1801(7) (1999). The marshaled evidence showed that despite Mr. Ison's claim in his 
letter that "all contracts, quotes, and commitments of Aristocrat Travel are null and 
^oid," the purchase agreement between Mr. Ison and Mr. Fiet was designed to transfer 
the group cruise to Mr. Ison. Addendum O. Further, contrary to Mr. Ison's claims that 
he was not bound to complete the booking, he attempted to do so. 
The marshaled evidence provided further that the contract with NCL required 
Aristocrat to pay only $12,800 by July 27, 1995. Addendum I at 1. NCL's accounting 
records revealed that the group cruise account had over $15,000 as of that date. 
Addendum K at 1-3. Based on this amount, the prosecutor argued that the purchase 
agreement was valid and that Mr. Fiet had "forwarded" all deposits to NCL. R. 392: 
614-15. At the very least, the State claimed that Mr. Ison recklessly disregarded the 
truth when he claimed that Mr. Fiet had not forwarded deposits. According to the 
prosecutor, NCL's transferring of several thousand dollars out of the group cruise 
account to pay for Mr. Fiet's other debts and the bounced check for $4796 technically 
were not failures to "forward" money. R. 392: 616-19. Instead, the prosecutor asserted 
that Mr. Ison recklessly relied on Mr. Lofthouse's and NCL's claims that Mr. Fiet had 
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not forwarded the deposits without determining the true nature of the shortages. R. 392: 
616-21. 
The marshaled evidence included further Mr. Ison's statement to the investigator 
that "between you and me" the difference between his prices and Mr. Fiet's pricing was 
"commissionable income/' R. 390: 242-43. The State claimed that this statement 
showed that Mr. Ison's actual motive in requesting more money was to increase his 
commissions. R. 392: 620-21. Based on this assumption, the State accused Mr. Ison of 
misrepresenting that Mr. Fiet's discount pricing was "not accurate." Addendum O. 
The prosecutor contended further that Mr. Ison's statement that NCL "will not 
release any cruise documents to Continental Travel until all funds due have been 
received by [NCL]" because NCL had repeatedly reduced the number of assigned cabins 
and the amount of money due without ever cancelling the cruise. R. 392: 623-24, 657. 
In support, Mr. Mendez testified that his interpretation of the telephone logs indicated 
that NCL had not threatened to cancel the entire group. Rather, he surmised that NCL 
was extremely flexible in handling the group cruise account. R. 391: 328-29. 
The other evidence presented at trial refutes the State's interpretation of the facts. 
Mr. Ison correctly understood that Mr. Fiet failed to forward deposits. From January to 
June of 1995, NCL repeatedly notified Aristocrat that it needed thousands more dollars 
in deposit money to book the 66 cabins. Addendum J at 1-3. On several occasions, NCL 
demanded money and adjusted downward the number of assigned cabins because of lack 
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of deposit money. R. 391: 288. NCL was so concerned about Aristocrat's poor payment 
history that Mr. Mendez ordered NCL employees to limit flexibility with Aristocrat and 
he assigned Ms. Perez to solely handle the account. R. 391: 288-89, 296, 308. Then, in 
June of 1995, NCL would only assign 33 cabins to the group because Aristocrat still 
owed $9,000 in deposit money. R. 391: 291-92. 
When Mr. Ison took over Aristocrat in August 1995, Mr. Lofthouse immediately 
informed him that Mr. Fiet had not forwarded adequate deposits. R. 390: 203; 392: 482, 
489. Mr. Lofthouse had sound reasons for this conclusion because he personally handled 
the cruise booking and payments and NCL had informed him earlier that month that 
Aristocrat owed $7,400 "to keep the cabins from canceling." R. 390: 189-91; 391: 290; 
Addendum J at 2. Mr. Lofthouse also never sent NCL the promised check for that 
amount. When Mr. Ison arrived at Aristocrat's offices on August 22, 1995, Mr. 
Lofthouse had a firm basis for warning Mr. Ison of the shortages. 
Mr. Ison had firm grounds for believing Mr. Lofthouse. Mr. Ison conscientiously 
instructed Mr. Lofthouse to conduct a complete accounting of the group cruise based on 
Mr. Lofthouse's responsibility for it. The accounting revealed that Mr. Fiet had not 
forwarded adequate funds for the cruise nor had he documented passenger payments. R. 
390: 205, 219-20; 392: 487-88. There was, thus, no way of determining who had paid 
for the cruise. R. 390: 203; 392: 482, 489. Mr. Ison accurately concluded from this 
investigation that Mr. Fiet had not pair the required deposits. In no sense, did Mr. Ison 
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intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly misrepresent the absence of adequate funds. 
Even accepting the prosecutor's technical distinction between deposit money and 
the money NCL transferred out of the account, this is a distinction without meaning. 
Assuming that adequate deposit money existed when Mr. Ison took over Aristocrat in 
August of 1995, it is undisputed that funds were lacking when Mr. Ison communicated 
with passengers in October of that year. The cause of the lost funds was immaterial. The 
end result was that Mr. Fiet was responsible for the missing money and that without 
additional funds Mr. Ison could not book the cruise. Also, time was of the essence 
because the September deadline for full payment had passed. In sum, Mr. Ison's 
representations that Mr. Fiet had not forwarded adequate money were accurate. 
Mr. Ison also had firm grounds for informing passengers that the group contract 
was "null and void." Addendum O. After conducting the accounting and learning of the 
shortages in the group cruise account, Mr. Ison could not confirm that Mr. Fiet had paid 
the required deposits. After consulting with Mr. Lofthouse and a legal advisor, Mr. Ison 
verified with them that he was not bound to honor the group cruise contract. R . 392: 
496, 529-30. Finally, Mr. Ison informed Mr. Fiet in a letter dated September 27, 1995 
that he would not assume responsibility for the group cruise because he could not 
confirm that Mr. Fiet had paid the deposit money. Addendum N. Because of the 
absence of confirmation, Mr. Ison truthfully represented that he was not contractually 
bound to complete the group booking. Harper, 1999 UT 34, ^ 14, 976 P.3d 1213. 
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Contrary to the State's perceived motive to obtain higher commissions, Mr. Ison 
rep* :mted that the prices were inaccurate based on his correct k J conclusion that he 
was not bound to honor Mr. Fiefs prices. Because shortages existed for the cruise, Mr. 
Ison needed to generate revenue to ensure that the group sailed and that he would not 
iOse Aristocrat's clientele. Mr. Ison, therefore, offered to enter into a new agreement 
with passengers. Stating that Mr. Fiefs pricing was not accu^ e correctly described that 
Mr. Fiet had not charged the full price for the cruise. Tt also arately communicated 
that more money was needed because Mr. Fiet had not adequately priced the cruise to 
cover any shortages. At the very least, in describing Mr. Fiefs pricing as inaccurate, Mr. 
Ison had no intent to intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly deceive passengers. 
Mr. Ison also had valid reasons for informing passengers of the threat of 
cancellation. The group cruise contract unequivocally provided that entire groups "will 
be automatically cancelled unless you contact us by the option date or if you fail to send 
the initial and/or second confirming deposit." Addendum I at 1. The State presented no 
evidence showing that Mr. Ison had knowledge or experience that would have led him to 
disbelief this explicit contractual right. Consistent with this statement, NCL informed 
Mr. Lofthouse on August 4, 1995 that it needed $7,400 immediately "to keep the cabins 
from canceling." Addendum J at 2. Further, Mr. Ison testified that Ms. Perez had 
threatened to cancel the entire cruise if c :rtain funding levels were not met. R. 392: 546, 
580-81. Even if Mr. Ison knew that NCL rarely cancelled entire groups, a reasonable 
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business person would have planned for this contingency. 
Further, Mr. Mendez's interpretation of the NCL's records was of limited 
probative value. As even he conceded, he had little personal knowledge or memory of 
NCL's dealings with the group cruise. R. 391: 275-77. Rather, Ms. Perez handled most 
of the communications with Mr. Ison. The only evidence the State presented of the lack 
of threats was Mr. Mendez's own interpretation of NCL's telephone logs. But, Mr. 
Mendez admitted that NCL's employees often had poor record-keeping habits. R. 391: 
290. In contrast, the explicit terms of the group cruise contract and Mr. Ison's 
unequivocal testimony of Ms. Perez's threats undermined Mr. Mendez's second-hand 
testimony. This paucity of evidence creates a reasonable doubt that Mr. Ison 
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly misrepresent the possibility of cancellation. 
Concerning the communications fraud charge involving Ms. Woodward, the 
marshaled evidence showed that both Mr. Ison and NCL possessed copies of a check for 
$1,000 that included Ms. Millyard's and June Field's names. Addendum Q; R. 391: 322; 
392: 555-56. The prosecutor contended that Mr. Ison either intentionally ignored the 
names on the check or that he had recklessly failed to notice the names. R. 392: 611-12. 
In contrast to these claims, neither Aristocrat nor NCL had a record crediting Ms. 
Millyard or Ms. Field with paying $500 each. R. 392: 557. In fact, NCL's records 
establish that the $1,000 check was pooled with all other cash deposits into the group 
cruise account without specifying who had sent the money. Addendum K at 4. Further, 
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Mr. Lofthouse informed Mr. Ison that he could not verify from his accounting whether 
Ms. Millyard and Ms. Field had pah .he $1,000. R. 390: 203; 392: 482, 489. 
In the absence of documentation from Aristocrat and NCL, Mr. Ison approached 
Ms. Woodward who had replaced Ms. Field, explained his honest understanding of the 
situation, and sugge ;*:d that she contact NCL directly to confirm the missing 
documentation. R. 391: 456. Mr. Ison suggested that Ms. Woodward pay NCI lirectly 
by credit card to ensure that she was credited for the criise and was assigned a cabin. R. 
391: 456-57. Ms. Millyard called NCL on October 30, 1995 and paid $1,000 by credit 
card the next day. Addendum J at 10; Addendum K at 9. 
At the very least, the evidence showed that Mr. Ison honestly believed that he 
could not document that Ms. Millyard and Ms. Field had paid the $1,000. This belief 
was not reckless because Mr. Ison relied on an accounting from Mr. Lofthouse who 
handled the group cruise and the payments for it, he contacted NCL and verified the 
$1,000 had not been credited to anyone specifically, and he asked Ms. Woodward to 
confirm his findings with NCL before she paid more money. His suggestion that Ms. 
Woodward pay NCL directly by credit card further supports Mr. Ison's lack of intent to 
defraud. If he were seeking more money for himself, he would have asked Ms. 
Woodward to pay him in cash. 
As further support of Mr. Ison's innocence, it is undisputed that Mr. Ison received 
no commissions for his efforts. In fact, Mr. Ison gave up his own cabin and personally 
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paid $6,800 to secure the voyage. R. 391: 371, 459; 392: 586-87. NCL's records 
confirm that Mr. Ison's intent in requesting more money was to "make up the difference 
[passengers paid] by cash. . . ." Addendum J at 7. As a testimony to Mr. Ison's good 
faith, despite all of his efforts he suffered a huge loss. Moreover, the ALJ's decision 
would have bolstered Mr. Ison's lack of intent had defense counsel admitted it. 
Because Mr. Ison communicated with passengers based on his good faith efforts 
to ascertain the truth and given that his statements were accurate, the State failed to 
establish any criminal intent. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543. At most, this case involved a 
civil matter to be sorted out among the passengers, Mr. Ison, Mr. Fiet, and NCL, rather 
than in a felony court. Accordingly, Mr. Ison seeks reversal of his convictions. 
III. DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE 
FOR FAILING TO TIMELY OBJECT TO 
AN UNLAWFUL RESTITUTION AWARD 
Trial courts may impose restitution for crimes of which the defendant is convicted, 
for conduct as part of a plea agreement, or when the defendant admits responsibility for 
other crimes. The trial judge below ordered Mr. Ison to pay restitution for conduct not 
related to the convictions and in the absence of any agreement or admission of 
responsibility. Defense counsel filed an untimely post-sentencing motion to correct the 
unlawful restitution award, thereby waiving any challenge to restitution. Defense 
counsel's deficient representation resulted in Mr. Ison paying for alleged crimes of which 
he was not convicted and for which he never agreed to pay. 
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Utah law does not allow for restitution to be awarded for alleged activities 
unconnected to the conduct for which Mr. Ison was convicted. Utah Code Annotated 
section 76-3-201 authorizes trial courts to pay restitution for crimes of which the 
defendant (1) is "convicted;" (2) "for which the defendant admits responsibility to the 
sentencing court;" or, (3) "for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make 
restitution as part of a plea agreement." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1 )(b), (4)(a)(i) 
(1999); see also State v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930, 937 (Utah 1998) (limiting restitution to 
these three situations). 
The trial judge awarded $500 in restitution to Mr. Shupe for his receiving a less 
expensive cabin than the one he paid for. The judge also awarded $773.55 to Patricia 
Burback for commissions that allegedly Mr. Fiet and Mr. Ison promised her. Mr. Ison 
did not agree to pay restitution as part of a plea agreement and he at no time admitted 
responsibility for defrauding any passengers. Further, the trial judge never "' firmly 
established'" that Mr. Ison admitted responsibility for other conduct. State v. Bickley, 
2002 UT App 342, TflO, 60 P.3d 582 (quoting State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, [^5, 
987 P.2d 1289)). Thus, the trial court only had authority to impose restitution for the 
crimes of which Mr. Ison was convicted. Galli, 967 P.2d at 937. 
The jury did not convict Mr. Ison for giving Mr. Shupe a less expensive cabin or 
for not paying Ms. Burback commissions. Rather the charges alleged that he "devised a 
scheme or artifice to defraud" passengers based on the October 11, 1995 letter and for his 
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conversation with Ms. Woodward. R. 2-3. Because Mr. Shupe's and Ms. Burback's 
losses had no connection with the communications with Ms. Woodward, Mr. Shupe and 
Ms. Burback were only entitled to restitution if they were victims of the October 11, 
1995 letter. Galli. 967 P.2d at 937. 
The alleged misrepresentations in that letter were totally unrelated to Mr. Shupe's 
and Ms. Burback's claims. Nothing in the letter addresses Mr. Shupe's cabin 
assignment. Although NCL records indicate that Mr. Ison requested NCL to assign Mr. 
Shupe a less expensive cabin, that act did not derive from the letter requesting more 
funds. In fact, Mr. Shupe testified at trial that despite the letter Mr. Ison agreed not to 
charge him or his group any additional funds. R. 389: 99-101. The crime of 
communications fraud applies to persons who devise a scheme to communicate with 
another "by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material 
omissions. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) (1999). Mr. Ison was not "convicted" 
for assigning Mr. Shupe to a less expensive cabin. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(l)(b) 
(1999). Rather, Mr. Shupe and Mr. Ison had a separate civil dispute over the cabin 
assignment. 
Likewise, Ms. Burback did not suffer any damages based on the representations in 
the letter. Instead, she claimed that Mr. Ison had promised to pay her commissions for 
the passengers she booked on the cruise. But, Mr. Ison was not "convicted" of depriving 
Ms. Burback of commissions. Id, Again, this was a separate civil dispute that had no 
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connection to the October 1K 1995 letter. 
Case law establishes that neither Mr. Shupe nor Ms. Burback were entitled to 
restitution. In GailL the trial court ordered the defendant to pay restitution for the money 
his family had forfeited when the defendant skipped bail an J fled to another state. 967 
P.2d at 937. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that because the defendant had not been 
convicted of bail jumping and never admitted responsibility for that crime, the 
defendant's family members were not victims under the restitution statute. Id. at 937-38. 
Similarly, in State v. Mast. 2001 UT App 402, ^|5, 40 P.3d 1143, although the 
defendant only pleaded guilty to receiving stolen property for some items taken in a 
burglary, the trial court ordered her to pay restitution for all the property stolen during the 
burglary. This Court ruled that the trial court lacked authority to impose restitution for a 
crime for which the defendant "was not convicted and for which she admitted no 
responsibility." IcL at ^fl6. This Court reached the same conclusion in Watson, where the 
defendant pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice for selling a car that she drove in 
fleeing from a murder. 1999 UT App 273,1J2, 987 P.2d 1289. This court held that the 
sentencing judge improperly "made inferences" that the defendant was involved in the 
murder and unlawfully ordered her to pay restitution for that crime. Id. at^[5. 
Despite the lack of authority to impose restitution, defense counsel failed to timely 
object to the restitution award. Utah Code Annotated section 76-3-20l(4)(e) (1999) 
requires criminal defendants to object to restitution awards "at or before sentencing." 
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State v. Weeks. 2000 UT App 273,1{9. 12 P.3d 110. affirmed on other grounds . 2002 UT 
98, 61 P.3d 1000. Defense counsel did not object at or before the sentencing hearing, 
but, rather, filed a motion challenging the restitution award one month after sentencing. 
R. 313. The failure to object at or before sentencing without good cause waives the right 
to a restitution hearing. Weeks. 2000 UT 273, ^ [10, 12 P.3d 110. Because Mr. Ison 
could have successfully challenged the restitution award, defense counsel unreasonably 
failed to file a timely objection. Templin. 805 P.2d at 186 
This failure prejudiced Mr. Ison. Id_ at 187. Mr. Shupe and Ms. Burback were 
not entitled to restitution, therefore, the trial judge's restitution award was unlawful. 
Galli, 967 P.2d at 937-38. Defense counsel's failure to file a timely objection resulted in 
Mr. Ison paying, at least, $1,273.55 more than he should have. This, this Court should 
vacate the restitution award for the amounts paid to Mr. Shupe and Ms. Burback. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Ison requests this Court to reverse his convictions for the lack of evidence. In 
the alternative, Mr. Ison requests a remand for the appointment of new counsel and a new 
trial and the vacation of the unlawful portions of the restitution award. 
Submitted, this £* day of April, 2003. 
KENT R. HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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John Lofthouse's Accounting for Nov. 26, 1995 cruise 
Letter to LaMar Fiet, September 27, 1995 
Letter, October 11, 1995 
Letter, October 17, 1995 
Check from Aristocrat to NCL, August 18, 1995 
Findings and Conclusions, Utah Consumer Protection 
Division, January 25, 1996 
Addendum A 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1999): Communications Fraud 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from another money, property, or 
anything of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions, and who 
communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any 
means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme 
or artifice is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, 
money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is less than 
$300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, 
money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or 
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, 
money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or 
exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, 
money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or 
exceeds $5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or 
artifice to defraud is other than the obtaining of something of 
monetary value. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under 
Subsection (1) shall be measured by the total value of all 
property, money, or things obtained or sought to be obtained 
by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except 
as provided in Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary 
element of the offense described in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense 
described in Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any 
person of property, money, or thing of value is not a 
necessary element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of 
executing or concealing a scheme or artifice described in 
Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of communication 
fraud. 
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means 
to bestow, convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by 
way of information; to talk over; or to transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to 
use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, 
newspaper, computer, and spoken and written communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless 
the pretenses, representations, promises, or material 
omissions made or omitted were made or omitted 
intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the 
truth. 
Addendum B 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees criminal 
defendants various fundamental rights: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land 
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time 
of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the 
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation. 
Addendum C 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees criminal 
defendants, among other rights, the right to counsel: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, 
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to 
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
Addendum D 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides all persons the right to due 
process of law: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law." 
Addendum E 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution includes the right to counsel in 
criminal cases: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused 
person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall 
not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband 
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy 
for the same offense. 
Addendum F 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(m) details the procedures for trial courts to 
follow when receiving questions from juries: 
After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be 
informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall 
inform the officer in charge of them, who shall communicate 
such request to the court. The court may then direct that the 
jury be brought before the court where, in the presence of the 
defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the 
inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be 
given. Such response shall be recorded. The court may in its 
discretion respond to the inquiry in writing without having the 
jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and the 
response thereto shall be entered in the record. 
Addendum G 
Utah Code Annotated section 76-3-201 (1999) defines in relevant part the trial 
court's authority to impose restitution: 
(1) As used in this section: 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense 
of which the defendant is convicted or any other 
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or 
without an admission of committing the criminal 
conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special 
damages, but not general damages, which a 
person could recover against the defendant in a 
civil action arising out of the facts or events 
constituting the defendant's criminal activities 
and includes the money equivalent of property 
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, 
and losses including earnings and medical 
expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or 
nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a 
victim, including the accrual of interest from the 
time of sentencing, insured damages, and 
payment for expenses to a governmental entity 
for extradition or transportation and as further 
defined in Subsection (4)(c). 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court 
may sentence a person convicted of an offense to any one of the 
following sentences or combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from 
public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise 
specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in 
prison without parole; or 
(0 to death. 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity 
that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other 
sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant 
make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this 
subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed 
to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. For purposes of 
restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in Subsection 
(l)(e). 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the 
court shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in 
Subsections (4)(c) and (4)(d). 
Addendum H 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 






SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 971018177 FS 
Judge: L. A. DEVER 
Date: November 29, 1999 
PRESENT 
Clerk: audreyj 
Prosecutor: CHARLENE BARLOW 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): DAVID GRINDSTAFF 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: February 3, 1947 
Video 
Tape Number: video Tape Count: 11-39-36 
CHARGES 
1. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/01/1999 Guilty 
2. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/01/1999 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
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Case No: 971018177 
Date: Nov 29, 1999 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 30 day(s) in 
the Salt Lake County Jail. 
SENTENCE FINE 


























The defendant is 
Restitution: 
Pay in behalf of 
to pay the following: 
Amount: $3717.15 Plus Interest 
STATE TO PROVIDE 
SCHEDULED TIMEPAY 
The following cases are on timepay 971018177. 
The defendant is to pay $250.00 monthly on the 30th. 
The number of payments scheduled is 24. 
The first payment is due on 1/30/2000 the final payment of $152.17 
is due on 01/30/2002. The final payment may vary based on 
interest. 
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Case No: 971018177 
Date: Nov 29, 1999 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 30 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report to the Salt Lake County Jail. 
Defendant is to report by December 3, 1999 by 5:00 p.m.. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 2000.00 which includes the surcharge, 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Violate no laws. / 
Dated t h i s fL day of H^\^V-( . l 9 i l . , 
DistrivcJ^Court Judge 
00263 
P a a p ^ H a s t ) 
Addendum I 
P 0 Boy C25403, Miami, Florida 33102-5403 
1-800-327-7030 
TRAVEL AGENT INFORMATION 
VOYAGE: 06951126 B 
REQUEST #: 15 ISSUE DATE: 06/01/95 
GROUP INFORMATION
 PAGE , or i 
ARISTOCRAT TRAVEL 
CONTACT: LEE 
1 106 W 500 SOUTH 
SUITE 1C4 
BOUNTIFUL, UT. 84010 US 
(801) 292-7273 
— • • — • ' ^ — — • ^ — ^ ^ ^ — — — — ^ — — . 
SHIP: M/S SEAWARD SAILING OATE: 11/26/95 
GROUP CONFIRMATION NO: 85553 
GROUP NAME: HADSEN GROUP 7 
SALES MANAGER: MINDY ALLEN j 
ALL RATES QUOTED ARE IN U.S. DOLLARS ALL CABIN RATES ARF PER PERSON BASED ON DOUR! F OGCl IPANCY; TO.IPL«E AND QUAD 
CABINS ARE ON A R -.QUEST BASIS. ALL PACKAGE RATES ARE PER PERSON. NOTE: AIR ADD-ON MUST BE APPLIED WHERE APPLICABLE. 
FOR CRUISE ONLY GROUPS PLEASE INQUIRE ABOUT OUR GROUP TRANSPORTATION SERVICES. 































































































A/S ADD-ON (SEE BELOW) 
A/S ADD-ON (SEE BELOW) 
A/S ADD-ON (SEE BELOW) 
A/S ADD-ON (SEE BELOW) 
A/S ADD-ON (SEE BELCW) 
A/S ADD-ON (SEE BELOW) 
A/S ADD-ON (SEE BELOW) 
749.00 749.00 
GROUP AIR SPACE REQUEST: 














PASSENGER FARE / 
VALID CATEGORY RANGE 
CATEGORY OS THRU 
CATEGORY OS THRU 
CATEGORY OS THRU 
CATEGORY OS THRU 
SCHEDULE: 
OPTION: 12/15/94 1600.00 
07/27/95 11200.00 












CABINS: 66 / H0 > ^ D I N I N G : WAITLISTED 
CONFIRMATION REMARKS: 
$ 2 0 0 . /PP Sc NAMES DUE IN HOUSE 7 DAYS 
AFTER CABIN ASSIGNMENT. RATES INCLUDE 
*STARWARD DISPLACEMENT GRP NO UPGRADES* 
CHILD TRAVELING AS 2ND PAX IN CABIN PAYS ADULT FARE. 
ONLY SNGLS PAYING DBL FARE ELIGIBLE FOR GRP RATE 8b TC. 
THE ABOVE IS BASED ON INFORMATION PROVIDED NCL AT THE TIME OF ISSUANCE OF THIS AGREEMENT. 
Please review both sides of this Group Agreement and sign below to indicate that you understand and aooept these Terms and Conditions. A signed oopy 
must be faxed or returned to our offioe within 30 days of issue date along with your initial deposit to P.O.Box 025403, Miami, Florida 33102-5403. Group 
options and review dates are strictly observed. Your space will be automatioally oanoelled unless you contact us by the option date or if you fail to send the 
initial and/or second confirming deposit. 
ACCEPTANCE OF THIS GROUP AGREEMENT CONSTITUTES ACCEPTANCE OF ALL TERMS & CONDITIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE 
PASSENGER TICKET CONTRACT OF PASSAGE AND GENERAL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE CRUISE GUIDE IN EFFECT AT THE BSUE 
DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT. 
^rcup Terms & Conditions 
Group Size R e q u i r e m e n t * 
Fo 3 4 and 7-day cruises Norwegian Cruse Line requires that a group consists of at least 15 full ac\jt fare paying passengers occupying a minimum of 6 cabnt For specai and 
ongercruises rmnimum requirements may vary 
Tour Conduotora 
Standard group poicy allows one complimentary Tour Conductor for every 15 full aduft fare payrg pas: jngen The 16th passenger will be the complimentary Tour Conductor berth 
Fo special and longer cruses the Tour Conductor allowance may vary The Tour Conductor allowance will be credited r the category n when the majority of the group space has 
been sod however r e Tour Conductor can be berthed at Norwegian Cruise I r e s discretion As long a. the majority of the group is on the Air/Sea program Tour Conductors are 
awa ded compi mentary a from the a r crry that is holding the most space n the group In the event that \n Air/Sea add-on is appicable ft shall also apply to any Tour Conductor 
Th rd and fourth passengers do not count towards the Tour Conductor Srgles payrg 200% of the full fare count as two passengers for Tour Conductor purpose Srgies payrg a 
mm mum of 150% of the full tare w H count as one passenger for Tour Conductor purpose Tour Conductors are non-dscountabte and non-commissonabie 
Disoounts 
Grouo fares ?"> air»ady dscojnted arc net subject to other discount programs not spectfcalfy applicable to the sailrg and/or the group Fares exclude port charges government 
taxes and fees Singles within the group must pay 200% of the full adult fare A child travelrg as the second passenger r a cabr pays the full adult fare Should the number of full 
tdrt paying adurt passenqers n the group fall below the size requirement all group discounts Tour Conductor allowances and any other consideration will be withdrawn Tour 
pacKages passenger insurance and Air/Sea add on s are non discountable however they arecommssionable at 10% 
C o m m i s s i o n 
S anaard travel agent commission w II apply to group bookrgs ft Is based on the discounted fare and does not apply to port charges cocktail parties other on board amenities 
prepa d graturties government taxes and fees or any other purchases 
Promot ional Activity 
A variety ot collateral and promotional items are available to assist you r your group marKetrg activities 
NOTE Discounted group rates may not be rcluded r any way r the advertising or promotion of group space to the general pubic nor may group space be resold to other travel 
agencies Group space cannot be wholesaled Norwegian Cruise Lre reserves the right to cancel all group space whether sold or unsold should this occur 
P a y m e n t s & Cabin Ass ignments 
it s very important to understand that by confirmrg a request for space Norwegian Cruise L r e guarantees confirmation by category not by cabr location The foltowrg polcy 
appi es to all standard groups 
Initial Deposit 
$2^ per person deposrt is due 30 days after confirmation 
Within 5 months $400 per person deposrt (10+day cruises) $200 per person deposit (7 day cruises) and $100 per person deposit (3 A 4 day cruises) is 
required 2 weeKs after confirmation 
Wrtnm 60 days of sailing (7+ day cruises) or within 45 days of sailrg (3 & 4 day cruises) any new group requires fral payment and roomrg 1st r-tiouse 
wrthm 48 hours of conf rmation 
S e c o n d Deposrt 
$375 per Derson deposrt for 10+ day cruises $175 per person deposit for 7 day cruises or $75 per person deposit tor 3 & 4 day cruises s due at 4 months 
(120 days prior to sailing) This second deposrt is not for cabin assignment - this deposrt is to contrue to hold space from 4 to 2 months prior to sailrg with 
Norweg an Cruise L r e s approval 
Wrthm 5 months $400 per person deposrt for 10+day cruises $200 per person deposit for 7 day cruises or $100 per person deposrt for 3& 4 day cruises s 
required 2 weeks after confirmation 
Wrthr 60 days of sailing (7+ day cruises) or wlthr 45 days of sailrg (3 & 4 day cruises) any new group requires f ra l payment and roomrg 1st r-house 
wrthr 48 hours 
NOTE For holiday sailmqs certain theme cruses repositioning cruses and cruises longer than 10 days a second confirmrg deposrt of $375 per person for 
10+ day cruses $175 per person for 7 day cruises or $75 per person for 3 & 4 day cruses will be required 5 months prior to sailrg 
Cabin Ass ignment 
$ 375 per person deposit for 10+ day cruses $175 per person for 7 day cruses or $75 per person for 3 & 4 day cruses will be required wlthr 7 days 
should ass anment be do^e before the second deDosrf is received 
If second deposrt has already been receved cabin assignment will be done without additional deposrt requirement 
NOTE Passenger names and r the case of Air/Sea groups air city will be required before a cabr can be assigned 
Final P a y m e n t 
No later that 60 days prior to sailing (7+ day cruses) or 45 days prior to sailrg (for 3 & $ day cruses) f ra l payment and roomrg 1st must be r house 
For groups booked on holiday sailings certain theme cruises reposrtionrg cruses or cruses longer than 7 days fra l payment and roomrg Ists are due 
in house 90 days prior to sailing 
N a m e C h a n g e s 
Name changes are not permitted wrthout the written approval of Norwegian Cruse Lre When changes are made to Air/Sea bookrgs that require ressue of air tckets a charge ot 
$20 per person will be assessed for each change 
Spaoe Review/ Ad justment 
Norwegian Cruse Line reserves the right to reclaim any or all unsold space at any time that s cabrs for when confirmrg deposit and names have not been received It s your 
responsibility to advise Norwegian Cruise Line of your sales progress to provide the required deposits and names r a timely manner and to submit sample copies of appicable 
promotional material Beginning at 6 months prior to sailing Norwegian Cruse Line will contact you every 30 days to review the progress of your sales While Norweqian Cruse 
Line may recall any or all unsold space or space held without names at any time you may continue to sell provided group space is available so that you may achieve the greatest 
possible success from your efforts 
Cancel lat ion Polioy 
Cabrs canceled after the Final Payment date will be assessed the following per person charges Repositioning Cruises, 
T*r»e & Four Day Cruises Seven Day Cruises 10+ day, Holiday & Theme Cruises 
45 30 days prior to sailrg $50 60 30 days prior to sailrg $100 90 60 days prior to sailing $200 
29 4 days prior to sailing $100 29 4 days prior to sailing $200 59 4 days prior to sailrg $400 
There will be no refund for "no-shows" or cancellations that occur less than 4 days prior to sailing day 
Refund requests must be In wrrtrg and accompanied with all documents Refund processing time s approximately 4 to 6 weeks after sailrg date 
Other Important Group Informat ion 
Groups will be automatcalfy canceled should any of the scheduled payments not be r house by due date 
For Groups of 100 passengers or more and incentive groups deposits payment and cancellation schedules are subject to other Terms & Conditions 
Failure to identify a "Student Group may result r the cancellation of the group and/or r the passengers berg denied boarding at the Pier Norwegian Cruse 
L r e allows Student Groups to sail between Easter and the second week r June and September through the second week r December Student Groups 
are excluded from certain theme repositioning holiday Easter sailings as well as cruses in the Bermuda and Alaska markets Student Groups cannot 
oA^eouo v,av 00 siuufcms pe sup A Siuuem Gioupb win oe assignea mam seating ummg uepenurgon uiegioup rmai oeposit ana I our oonauctor 
polcies vary A Securrty Deposrt of $50 per student minimum of $1000 per group is required at the time of fral payment This deposrt will be refunded upon 
written request provided no damage has been sustared by Norwegian Cruise Line One adult chaperone 25 years or older must accompany even/ ten 
students A Parent/Guardian Consent and Release Form must be completed and signed for each mror and returned to the Passenger Courtesy Department 
at time of fral payment Any mror failing to have this form completed and signed by a parent/guardian may be denied boardrg You may obtar this form by 
callrg our Passenger Courtesy Department In addition all Student Groups must prepay all on board graturties 
All reservations are subject to change in the event of a full ship charter and/or itinerary change 
Triple/Quad cabrs are limited and are available on a request basis only Third and Fourth passengers cannot be guaranteeeed by the travel agent to their 
client until prior confirmation has been obtared from Norwegian Cruise Lre 
On Air/Sea passengers Norwegian Cruse Lre will only block air space upon receipt of second (confirmrg) deposit air/sea city and passenger names This 
s to prevent any untimely release or nonuse of air space close to sailing date Late submission of rooming lists and final payment may result r air allocations 
berg revoked by the airlines If we are unable to secure air for your booking at that time the group will be reverted to cruse only status 
Insurance 
Trip cancellation protection is available for any passenger who s part of the group Payment must be made no later than the groups f ra l payment date Insurance payments are 
paid separately and should be mailed directly to Norwegian Cruise Lines Accounting Department ATT Insurance Desk P O Box 025403 Miami Florida 33102 5403 
Ass is tance 
The Group Servces Department will assist you with all your group needs after the initial bookrg (e g additions deletions changes payment or general information) For special 
servces (e g amenrties cocktail parties meeting rooms passengers wrfn certar medcal condrtions) contact our Passenger Cou tesy Department 
R e m e m b e r , Norweg ian Cruise Line #1 in Serv ioe wi th 1 Number 1 -800-327-7030 or 305-445-0866 (Miami) 
Touch 1) Individual Reservation Touch 2) Group Reservations / Group Servces Touch 3) Sales Servce 
Touch 41 Paaaenaer Courtesv Touch 5) Brochures Touch 6) Refunds 
Addendum J 
NAME TYPE (l/G) G RES 85553 
MADSEN GROUP T 
AGENT 801 292-7273 PORTS SJU SJU 
l.GRP RES: LSF RQO 11/15/94 
GREEN SAILING RQO 11/15/94 
NOT A STUDENT GRP RQO 11/15/94 
OFFERED INSURANCE RQO 11/15/94 
2.RES-HILARY/GWEN ADV T/A JOHN THAT THE CC IN THE RMH 12/15/94 
AMOUNT OF $800 FOR PASSENGERS OWENS WAS DECLINED RMH 12/15/94 
JOHN ADV THAT HE WILL HAVE THE T/A CALL THE CLIENT RMH 12/15/94 
AND GIVE US A CALL BACK. (GWEN) RMH 12/15/94 
LM FOR T/A JOHN $4400.00 ADDL $ DUE 1WEEK FOR NBS 01/19/95 
CBNS ASSIGNED OR 11 CBNS WILL BE UNASSIGNED. NBS 01/19/95 
3. GRP SERV- STARWARD DISPLACEMENT OK PER T/A JOHN RY4 02/21/95 
TO MOVE FROM 20951124 TO SEAWARD 06951226 RATES RY4 02/21/95 
PROTECTED. NO MOVE UPGRADES AT THE PROTECTED RY4 02/21/95 
RATE IF THEY WANT MORE UPGARDES THEY PAY THE RY4 02/21/95 
CURRENT RATE. RY4 02/21/95 
## EXPIRED CABIN OPT ALL CAT I CABINS CXLD ALSO NA0 03/07/95 
?F2=FWD PF4-REFRESH PF9=RETURN PF12=ARM PAGE: 1 OF 13 




G E N E R A L 
T 
N O T E S OPTION (A,I,U) I 
TYPE (I/G) G RES 0085553 
AGENT 801 292-7273 
PER NOTES ON FRONT PAGE THIS GRP NOT TO RECEIVE 
UPGRADES-BJJ 
GRP RESV-T/A JOHN BOOKED CABIN 8004 
**7 MONTH 
TTL=64 SLD=10 CUT=0 REM=64 
GRP RESV - DSM MINDY ALLEN XL FIT BKG#5010543 
CBN#4015, BKG#5020203 CBN#4006/ TRANS 
TO THIS GROUP AT CURRENT GRP RATE. 
AVO DONE TO TRANS $400 FOR EACH CABIN. 
**4 MONTH 
TTL=66 SLD=53 
TTL=66 SLD=53 CUT=0 REM=66 
ADVISED JOHN, HE NEEDS TO SEND AN ADD'L $7400 IN 
ORDER TO KEEP THE CBNS FROM CANCELING. HE ADVISED 
HE WAS GOING TO CUT A CHECK TODAY. I WAS NOT ABLE 
TO ASSIGN ALL CBNS. I STILL OWE THE FOLLOW: 
PF2=FWD PF3=BWD PF4-REFRESH PF9=RETURN PF12=ARM 
ENTER 
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ti £ JN £ K A L 
T 
N O T E S OPTION (A,I,UJ I 
TYPE (I/G) G RES 0085553 
AGENT 801 292-7273 
***8 MONTH REVIEW 
TTL:60 SLD:12 CUT:0 REM:60 
***8 MONTH REVIEW-CORRECTION 
TTL:60 SLD:9 CUT:0 REM:60-CBN#7015 7215 8017 CXLD 
DUE TO EXP OPT 
5 MOS WITH JOHN 
TTL-66 SLD-55 CUT-0 REM-66 ADV WE NEED ADD $9000 
FOR 55 CBNS SLD I WILL GIVE ASSIGNMENTS FOT A TTL 
OF 33 & WILL ASSIGN REST WHEN $ RECD' 
WILL FAX CBN #'S AND JOHN WILL FAX BACK RM LIST 
SLD 3 CAT A,16 CAT C,8 CAT D, 24 CAT J, 2 CAT G, 
2 CAT F 
SPOKE TO JOHN, RE. FINAL. HE ASKED ME THE NEW ITIN 
FOR THE SHIP SINCE THE PAX COUNT WILL BE REFLECTED 
ON THE CHANGE. HE ADVISED ME HE WILL NOT HAVE A 
FNL COUNT UNTILL MONDAY. 
PF2=FWD PF3=BWD PF4-REFRESH PF9=RETURN PF12=ARM 
ENTER 


































3 OF 13 




G E N E R A L N O T E S OPTION (A,I,U) I 
TYPE (I/G) G RES 0085553 
AGENT 801 292-7273 
CAT J-17 CBNS AND CAT C-13 CBNS. I ADVISED JOHN, 
TO SEND A ROOMING LIST. 
SEE 2ND PAGE OF NOTES FOR THE FIRST PART OF THIS 
REVIEW. 
GRP RESV- T/A LOU CALLED TO TELL ME THAT THE OLD 
AGENT ON THIS RES IS TAKING THE MONEY FR 
FROM THE CLIENTS AND HE IS NO LONGER 
WORKING FOR THE COMPANY. LOU WANTS NO 
ONE BUT HIMSELF AND JOHN DO BE ABLE TO 
GET ON THIS RECORD..THE NEW # TO THE AGE 
AGENCY IS 8014849800 
SPOKE TO LYNN IN GRUP SERVICES ADV T/A "LOU"" REQ 
A 48 HR PERIOD TO GET ROOMING LIST AND MONIES IN 
LYNN SAID O.K. BUT CABINS MUST BE RLS TODAY 
LOU AGREED HE WOULD CALL IN AND RLS..ALLISON 2798 
PF2=FWD PF3=BWD PF4-REFRESH PF9=RETURN PF12=ARM 
































4 OF 13 
"DT7R - - * * 
NAME 
MADSEN GROUP 
v? r> iv JL n. / i IJ IN U T Ci O 
TYPE (I/G) G RES 0085553 
AGENT 801 292-7273 
**FINAL 
TTL=66 SLD=49 CUT=17 REM=49 
GRP SERV--SENT REQUEST TO REFUNDS TO CREDIT CC FOR 
$2058 AS CARD WAS DOUBLE CHARGED. 
##PM#M4######################################## 
T/A CALLED LOU TO ADVISE THAT ALL PAX ARE IN GOOD 






THESE NEED TO PAY AGAIN IN ORDER TO SECURE THEIR 
CABIN ALLISON X2798 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
*********************5gg NEXT PAGE**************** 
PF2=FWD PF3=BWD PF4-REFRESH PF9=RETURN PF12=ARM 
ENTER 
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SELECTION NUMBER -- * * 
RSM0183 G E N E R A L N O T E S OPTION (A,I ,U) I 
NAME TYPE (I/G) G RES 0085553 
MADSEN GROUP T 
AGENT 801 292-7273 PORTS SJU SJU 
SALES - FYI FOR OUR INFO O N L Y > » » » » » » » » RPD 10/24/95 
HAVE SPOKE TO NAY'S AND BIRCH'S RE: THE FACT THEY RPD 10/24/95 
HAVE TO CXL AS BOTH PARTIES ONLY HAVE A UCC IN THE RPD 10/24/95 
AMT OF $400.00 HERE. MADE AN OFFER TO BOTH THESE RPD 10/24/95 
PARTIES TO WAIVE PENALTIES... SINCE THEY WOULD RPD 10/24/95 
CRUISE IF WE WOULD HAVE REC FINAL WHICH THEY PAID RPD 10/24/95 
BY CHECK AND IT WAS CASHED BUT NEVER SENT INTO NCL RPD 10/24/95 
ALSO, ADV IF THEY WANTED TO TRY TO SAIL WE WOULD RPD 10/24/95 
BOOK THEM INDIVIDUALLY AND OFFER A SPECIAL RATE OF RPD 10/24/95 
$399.00 PP PLUS $459 AIR ADD-ON PLUS PORT CHARGES. RPD 10/24/95 
THIS WAY THEY WOULD STILL HAVE TO PAY AGAIN BUT RPD 10/24/95 
THEY COULD REC A LOWER FARE AND STILL CRUISE W GRP RPD 10/24/95 
ALSO, NCL WOULD OFFER THE OTHER 3 COUPLES THE RPD 10/24/95 
SAME RATE HOWEVER SINCE WE SUPPOSEDLY DO NOT HAVE RPD 10/24/95 
ANY OF THEIR MONIES WE WOULD JUST BK THEM IN F.I.T RPD 10/24/95 
PENALTIES WILL BE ACCESSED TO CONTINENTAL FOR ANY RPD 10/24/95 
PF2=FWD PF3=BWD PF4-REFRESH PF9=RETURN PF12=ARM PAGE: 6 OF 13 
ENTER SELECTION NUMBER -- ** 
<-/ W Li 11 U iV n U ±* \S J. MJ KS v*. J>4.v*« %*•*/ * / ^ / — 
NAME TYPE ( I / G ) G RES 0 0 8 5 5 5 3 
MADSEN GROUP T 
AGENT 8 0 1 2 9 2 - 7 2 7 3 PORTS SJU SJU 
CABINS CXL, I ADVISED LOU OF SUCH AS NOW 2 COUPLES RPD 10 /24 /95 
WANT TO CXL BECAUSE THE NAYS AND BIRCHS ARE NOT RPD 10 /24 /95 
GOING ONE OF THESE PAXS SPOKE TO ME AND ARE RPD 10 /24 /95 
AWARE OF PENALTIES LOU IS TRYING TO SAY SOMEONE RPD 1 0 / 2 4 / 9 5 
ADVISED HIM WE WOULD WAIVE PENALTIES BUT SINCE DAY RPD 10 /24 /95 
ONE WE ADVISED PENALTIES IN AFFECT PLZ NOTE RPD 10 /24 /95 
SINCE LOU TOOK OVER WE HAVE LOWERED OUR FARES BY RPD 10 /24 /95 
USING UPGRADES THAT ARE BEING OFFERED. LOU IS RPD 10 /24 /95 
STILL CHARGING PAXS MORE MONEY (UP TO $274PP) AND RPD 1 0 / 2 4 / 9 5 
ADVISED ITS TO MAKE UP FOR THE DIFFERENCE PAXS PD RPD 10 /24 /95 
BY CASH..BUT HE'S STILL MAKING THOSE 5 COUPLES RPD 10 /24 /95 
PAY AGAIN. RPD 10 /24 /95 
***LOU CALLED ADV HE WILL APPROACH NAYS AND BIRCH RPD 10 /24 /95 
AND GIVE THEM 2 T.C.BERTHS AND PUT THEM IN QUAD RPD 10 /24 /95 
AND HAVE THEM PAY DIFFERENCE... HE SAYS HE WILL RPD 1 0 / 2 4 / 9 5 
GIVE HIS CABIN UP. (BUT THAT CBN IS NOT A T.C RATE RPD 10 /24 /95 
PF2=FWD PF3=BWD PF4-REFRESH PF9=RETURN PF12=ARM PAGE: 7 OF 13 




G E N E R A L N O T E S OPTION (A,I,U) I 
TYPE (I/G) G RES 0085553 
AGENT 801 292-7273 
AND IT WOULD BE PENALIZED IF HE CXL... HE WANTS TO 
CXL 2 CABINS OUT OF THREE I ADV WE WOULD NOT 
PENALIZE THE NAYS AS THEY WOULD BE TRAVELING BUT 
AS A THIRD AND FOURTH...WITH THE BIRCHS . THIS 
OFFER WAS MADE DUE TO THESE COUPLES CIRCUMSTANCES. 
IF PAXS DOES NOT ACCEPT OFFER DUE TO THEIR 
FINANCIAL SITUATIONS THE OWENS AND HEAPS WILL CXL 
TOO. (UNDER PENALTY AS THEY ARE PD IN FULL) 
***SENT REQUEST TO REFUNDS TO CREDIT CC FOR PAX 
JOHNSON FOR $200. 
***SENT REQUEST TO REFUNDS TO CREDIT CC FOR PAX 
BIRCH FOR $400 PER S/A. 
***SENT REQUEST TO REFUNDS TO CREDIT CC FOR PAX 
NAY FOR $400 PER S/A. 
CANCELLED 6 CABINS WITH ALLISON ASSESSING PENALTY 
TO 4 OF THE CABINS. WAIVED ON 2 PER S/A. 
PF2=FWD PF3=BWD PF4-REFRESH PF9=RETURN PF12=ARM 
ENTER 
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Ci £ N IS K A L N O T E S UPT1UN IA, I,UJ 1 
TYPE (I/G) G RES 0085553 
AGENT 801 292-7273 
SENT REQUEST TO REFUNDS TO CREDIT CC FOR PAX OWENS 
FOR $2458, PAX HEAP FOR $2258, PAX FOWLES FOR $200 
PAX LUPTON FOR $400 AND PAX LARSON FOR $879. 
****SALES SPOKE TO LOU TO ADV HIS BAL WAS$10954.36 
LOU WAS NOT TO HAPPY BY THIS AS HE STATES HIS BAL 
REFLECTS AROUND $3500 OR $3900...I EXPLAINED THAT 
THERE WAS A $1000 PENALTY HE DOES NOT BELIEVE WE 
SHOULD PENALIZE PARKERS, BILLS AND JOHNSTONS I 
TOLD HIM IF THE GRP WAS TO BE HELD UP BY A $600 
BAL I WOULD ""THEN AND ONLY THEN" CONSIDER WAIVING 
PENALTIES HE ADVISED NCL DOES NOT HELP HIM IN 
HIS SITUATION. I ADV IF WE DID NOT HELP HIM I 
WOULD HAVE NOT LOWERED THE FARES BY USING CURRENT 
UPGRADES AND I WOULD HAVE ADJUSTED HIS COMM TO 
REFLECT THE LOWER AMT WHICH HE IS CONTRACTED AT. 
LOU REQ TO MOVE SHUPE TO CAT J AND CXL HIS CABIN 
PF2=FWD PF3=BWD PF4-REFRESH PF9=RETURN PF12=ARM 
ENTER 
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G E N E R A L 
T 
N O T E S OPTION (A,I,U) I 
TYPE (I/G) G RES 0085553 
AGENT 801 292-7273 
I ADV LOU HE WOULD BE PENALIZED AS WELL... 
************************************************** 
CURRENT BAL AS FOLLOWS: 
MUST REFUND TO CC $7395 
AND BAL ON GRP $1115.83 
MONIES TO BE PAID $8510.83 
(PRIOR ADV BAL $10954.36) 
REMEMBER A T/C WAS LOST DUE TO CXL RESERVATIONS 
AND CC REFUNDED TO PAX NOT ON ROOMING LIST 
-SALES- PAX TERRY MILLYARD CALLED TO ASK IF $1000 
HAS BEEN SENT IN BY ARISTOCRAT TRAVEL. SHE INITIA 
LLY PAID THIS BY CHECK/CASH BEFORE THEY WENT UNDER 
AND SHE IS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THE MONEY 
WOULD BE SENT IN. HER NUMBER @ WORK IS 801 5248904 
CONTINENTAL TRAVEL TOLD HER THAT SHE STILL OWES 
THEM $1000. BRIAN X2892 
PF2=FWD PF3=BWD PF4-REFRESH PF9=RETURN PF12=ARM 
ENTER 
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U U W B K A L W U T JS b 
TYPE (I/G) G RES 0085553 
AGENT 801 292-7273 
***SALES*** RE: 10/31 5:00 PM 
PLZ NOTE LOU CALLED IN ADVISING HIS CC# FOR FINAL 
TO CLEAR BAL BY MISTAKE AGENT ACCEPTED AND LOU WAS 
UNDER THE IMPRESSION BAL CLEARED GLENROY IN 
GRP SERVICES CALLED AGENCY AND SPOKE TO JOHN. ADV 
JOHN THAT THERE WAS A BALANCE AND LOU WAS AWARE OF 
THIS AS WELL AS THE FACT EVERYTHING HAD TO BE ON 
UCC IMPRINT ONLY 
AT THIS TIME TOOK FAX # OUT- UNTIL BAL IS CORRECT 
ON GRP SO NOTHING ""WILL OR SHOULD""BE FAXED TO 
AGENCY (OR LOU) UNTIL MONIES ARE ADJUSTED 
**GRP RES- LOU FROM AGENCY S 
WILL SEND UCC IMPRINTS FROM US MAIL 
EF158113295 US 11/1 
SEE NEXT PAGE REQ CC CHARGES TO BE PULLED 
AND REFUNDED A.S.A.P ( AMT $7395 ) 
PF2=FWD PF3=BWD PF4-REFRESH PF9=RETURN PF12=ARM 
ENTER 
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G E N E R A L N O T E S OPTION (A,I,U) I 
TYPE (I/G) G RES 0085553 
AGENT 801 292-7273 
SALES SPOKE TO LOU TODAY 
ADVISED HE HAD TO FLY BACK INTO TOWN AS UTAH 
CONSUMER PROTECTION FILED MON 10/30 SUMMONS AND 
SUBPOENAS ON LOU AND CONTINENTAL TRAVEL...AS WELL 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAD A HEARING WITH LEE FEIT 
ON TUES 10/31 THIS INFO WAS GIVEN TO ME BY LOU 
*LOU ADV THAT THEY OR HE WAS BLAMING NCL AS THEY 
WOULD NOT REFUND ANY CASH PAYMENTS I ADVISED 
LOU ONCE AGAIN THAT IF HE EVER WANTED ANY PAYMENT 
THAT WAS NOT A UCC TO BE PULLED ALL HE HAD TO DO 
IS PUT IT IN WRITING TO US TO HAVE IT REFUNDED OFF 
THE GROUP ONCE AGAIN HE ADV "I CAN'T DO THAT". 



























PF2=FWD PF3=BWD PF4-REFRESH PF9=RETURN PF12=ARM PAGE: 12 OF 13 




G E N E R A L N O T E S OPTION (A,I,U) I 
TYPE (I/G) G RES 0085553 
AGENT 801 292-7273 
COLLECTIONS- LEFT MESSAGE ON T/A PHONE MAIL TO 
OBTAIN CREDIT CARDS COPIES. MARIA 4797 
COLLECTIONS- DOCS REL. MARIA 4797 
*-DOCS FINAL ML VIA A/B 11/9 DKK 
GRPS-LOU CALLED AT 5:05 PM TO SEE IF $$ FOR PAX 
HEAP HAD BEEN REFUNDED BECAUSE PAX CAME TO 
HIS OFFICE YESTERDAY AND REBOOKED. HE BKD 
THEM IN FIT (5312301) AND WANTED THE $$ TO BE 
TRANSFERRED FROM HERE TO THERE. REFUNDS WAS 
CLOSED AND ALLISON IS OUT SICK; SINCE $$ IS 
HERE DID AN AVO TO TRANSFER THE $$. SENT COPY 
FOR ALLISON KEPT ONE AT MY DESK AND SENT ONE 
TO REFUNDS. X-2293 SHARON 
PER DIANA THIS WILL NOT BE DONE BECAUSE HE 
WAS TOLD NOT TO SPEAK TO ANYONE BUT ALLISON. 
SWITCHED 7010 FOR 7203 W/ ALLISON (SALES) 
PF3=BWD PF4-REFRESH PF9=RETURN PF12=ARM 
ENTER 
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CC AUT APP 
CC AUT APP 
CC AUT APP 
CC AUT APP 
CC AUT APP 
CC AUT APP 
CC AUT APP 
CC AUT APP 
CC AUT APP 
CC AUT APP 
CC AUT APP 
CC AUT APP 
CC AUT DEN 
CC AUT DEN 





TYPE G RES/GROUP 0085553 
AGT# 801 2927273 YYMMDD TO YYMMDD 
NAME MADSEN GROUP T 
COMM% .1900 
ADDL SERV .00 
CHG TO 














780 D 09813 
780 D 02823 
780 D 26957 
780 D 46065 
780 D 14995 
780 
OWENS 
9:PKG 10 .-DINING 
PF5:ALL 
$400.00 780 D 25284 
11:LINE CHG 21:CBN CNL 13:ASGN 



















001 OF 009 
SEL -- ** 




















































PF7:CABIN 8: AIR 
1.-1ST 2: :FWD 3:BWD 
AGT# 801 2927273 
GROUP NAME MADSEN 









































9:PKG 10:DINING 11: 






































































. * * 
RSM0136-036-95124 
V/G 06951126 





DATE TIME CD 
950206 193053 50 
950215 131616 50 CC 
950215 131616 50 CC 
950324 173225 50 CC 
950324 173225 50 CC 
950327 122104 50 CC 
950327 122104 50 CC 
950406 115530 50 CC 
950406 115530 50 CC 
950406 165419 50 CC 
950406 165419 50 CC 
950418 132840 50 CC 
950418 132840 50 CC 
950512 132244 50 CC 
950512 132244 50 CC 
?F7:CABIN 8:AIR 9 
L:1ST 2:FWD 3:BWD 4:LST 
AGT# 801 2927273 
GROUP NAME MADSEN GROUP 
.0000 COMM% .1900 
DISC% .0000 ADDL SERV .00 
CHG DESC CHG FROM 
CC AUT APP CHRISTENSEN,D. 
AUT APP $400.00 
AUT APP EDWARDS 
AUT APP 































LINE CHG 21:CBN CNL 
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L:1ST 2: :FWD 3:BWD 
> ACCTG HISTORY 
GROUP NAME 
COMB DISC% .0000 
' DISC 
CHG DESC 
CC AUT APP 





CC AUT APP 




















9:PKG 10:DINING 11: 
4:LST PF5: ALL PF6: 
TYPE 
AGT# 801 2927272 
; MADSEN GROUP 
COMM% .1900 

















CHG 21:CBN CNL 
:CC HST 12:ARM 15:AIR 
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GROUP ACCTG HISTORY 






































AGT# 801 2927273 
GROUP NAME MADSEN GROUP 
.0000 
.0000 
CHG DESC CHG FROM 
CASH ENTRY 
CC AUT APP 
CC AUT APP 





CC AUT APP 
CC AUT APP 
CC AUT APP 
CASH ENTRY 
CASH ENTRY 
CC AUT APP 




9:PKG 10:DINING 11: 
4:LST PF5:ALL PF6: 
COMM% .1900 













CHG 21:CBN CNL 
:CC HST 12:ARM 15:AIR 
G RES/GROUP 0085553 
I YYMMDD TO YYMMDD 
T 
CHG TO OPR 
EAF 
200 D 005750 EAK 
200 D 005997 EAK 
200 D 005173: EAK 
$4796.00 020 PAB 
$2919.52 020 PAB 
$2510.44 020 PAB 
$750.00 020 PAB 
201 D 020160 EAF 
201 D 020347 EAF 
201 D 020512 EAF 
EAF 
EAF 
200 D 078719 EAF 
200 EAF 
13:ASGN 14:RM LST 
D/D PAGE 005 OF 009 





















































































































ADDL SERV .00 
LINE CHG 
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SEL -- ** 




















































1.-1ST 2: :FWD 3:BWD 
COMB 

























































PF5: ALL PF6 
AGT# 801 2927273 
! MADSEN GROUP 
COMM% .1900 
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GROUP ACCTG HISTORY 






















GROUP NAME MADSEN GROUP 
COMB DISC% .0000 
DISC 
CHG DESC 
CC AUT APP 
CASH ENTRY 
CC AUT APP 
CC AUT APP 
CC AUT APP 
CC AUT APP 
CC AUT APP 
CC AUT APP 















9:PKG 10:DINING 11: 
4:LST PF5: ALL PF6: 
:LINE CHG 
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GROUP ACCTG HISTORY 











COMB DISC% .0000 
DISC% .0000 
CHG DESC CHG FROM 
CANCL PNLT 
CC AUT APP 
CC AUT APP 
CC AUT APP ISON,LUKE 
ADJ CC 
ADJ CC 





AGT# 8 0 1 2927273 
1 MADSEN GROUP 
COMM% . 1 9 0 0 
ADDL SERV . 0 0 






YYMMDD TO YYMMDD 
T 
CHG TO OPR 
2 0 0 . 0 0 OA3 
200 D 031752 EAD 
780 F 131750 RHO 
RHO 
$ 4 0 0 . 0 0 020 PAB 
$ 4 0 0 . 0 0 020 PAB 
EAF 
$ 2 0 5 8 . 0 0 020 PAB 
$ 4 0 0 . 0 0 025 EAN 
PF7:CABIN 8:AIR 9:PKG 10:DINING 11:LINE CHG 21.-CBN CNL 13:ASGN 14:RM LST 
P F 1 : 1 S T 3:BWD PF5:ALL PF6:CC HST 12=ARM 15:AIR D/D PAGE 009 OF 009 
NO MORE RECORDS PF16:NOTES CLEAR:RET SEL . * * 
Addendum L 
PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
THIS /1REEMENT, made this <?/ day of August, 1995, by and 
between ARISTOCRAT TRAVEL SERVICES, INC,, of Utah, hereinafter 
known as "Seller- and COHTXHENTAL TRAVEL, L.L.C. of Utah, 
hereinafter known as "Buyer*" 
WHEREAS, Buyer desires to buy, and Seller desires to sell to 
Buyer, certain assets of Seller's in consideration for the sum of 
Sixty Thousand and no/100 Dollars ($60,000), all upon the terms 
and conditions hereinafter set forth. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants 
herein entered into, be it agreed. 
1. On the terms and subject to the conditions herein set 
forth, Seller hereby agrees to convey, transfer, assign and 
deliver to Buyer, free and clear of any and all encumbrances and 
liens, and Buyer agrees to acquire and accept as hereinafter 
provided the following assets and property: 
All equipment, inventory, assets, cruise and tour bookings, 
phone numbers, customer lists, exterior signs, Salt Lake location 
equipment and phone numbers (if recovered), and "good will", as 
set forth on Schedule "AH, attached hereto, of that certain 
business known as Aristocrat Travel, having a value of $60,000. 
(Cash on hand and in Seller/s bank accounts are not included.) 
2. As full and complete consideration for Seller's assets 
conveyed to Buyer, buyer Agree* to pay Seller as follows: 
a. $10,000, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by 
Seller; 
b. The balance of $50,000 as follows: 
1) Fifty (50) percent of all commissions on all 
existing cruise groups booked through Seller's agency 
or those cruises leaving during November 1995, 
December 1995, and January 1996; and 
2) Ten (10) percent of the net profits from all 
Buyers locations, included but no limited to Layton 
Hills Mall, Bountiful, and 2100 South office; (The net 
profit shall be determined by deducting from gross 
revenues reasonable operating expenses and 
commissions). 
3* Buyer shall not assume any liabilities of Seller. 
Further, this sale of assets does not include any transfer of any 
interest in Seller's corporation. 
4. The assets and property to be conveyed, transferred, and 
assigned and delivered to Buyer shall not include such assets and 
property of Seller's as (i) may have been disposed of prior to the 
closing date in the ordinary course of business, or in the payment 
and discharge of liabilities or obligations on or before closing 
date as hereinafter provided, and (ii) may have been otherwise 
disposed of prior to the closing date at the request, or with the 
consent in writing of Buyer. 
5. To the extent that the assignment of any contract, 
license, lease, commitment, sales order or purchase order be 
assigned to Buyer as provided herein is not permitted without the 
consent of the other party thereto/ this Agreement shall not 
constitute an agreement to assign the same if such consent is not 
given. 
6. The closing under this Agreement shall take place at 
10:00 a.m. on August >K^.9 95, at the business location known as 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111. 
7. At the closing, the conveyance, transfer, assignment and 
delivery of the assets and property of Seller's to Buyer shall be 
effected by such full covenant and warranty deeds, bills of sale 
with covenants of warranty, endorsements, assignments, and other 
good and sufficient instruments of transfer and conveyance as 
Buyer shall request. 
8. Appropriate forms of such instruments of transfer and 
conveyance in conformity with this Agreement shall be submitted to 
Buyer by the counsel of Seller for examination within a reasonable 
time in advance of the closing date. 
9. Seller agrees that they will, at any time, and from time 
to time after the closing date, upon request of Buyer, to execute, 
acknowledge and deliver, or will cause to be done, executed, 
acknowledged and delivered, all such further acts, deeds, 
assignments, transfers, conveyances, powers of attorney and 
assurances as may be required in conformity with this Agreement, 
or for aiding and assisting in collecting and reducing to 
possession, any or all of the assets or property to be assigned to 
Buyer as provided herein and any or all obligations of Seller 
hereunder* 
10. Any excise, sales, use of other Federal, State or Local 
tax levied or assessed by reason of the performance of or arising 
as a result of this Agreement, exclusive of any taxes based on net 
income, which are payable by Seller, are to be borne by Buyer. 
Property taxes levied on the personal property being sold shall be 
prorated between Seller and Buyer. 
11. The Seller shall indemnify and hold harmless Buyer in 
relation to: 
a. All liabilities and obligations of, or claims 
against Seller not expressly assumed herein by Buyer. (Buyer is 
not assuming any liabilities or obligations of Seller*) 
b. Any damage or deficiency due to any breach of 
warranty, misrepresentation, or non-fulfillment of any agreement 
on the part of Seller's under this Agreement, or from any 
misrepresentation or omission from any certificates or other 
instrument given, or to be given to Buyer, pursuant to this 
Agreement. 
-4-
c. All actions/ suits, proceedings, demands, 
assessments, judgments, costs, and expenses connected with the 
indemnifications and hold harmless set forth in paragraph 11• 
12. Seller shall reimburse Buyer, on demand, for any payment 
made by Buyer at any time after the date of this Agreement, or by 
Buyer at any time after the closing, with respect to any 
liability, obligation, or claim to which the* foregoing indemnity 
by Seller relates. 
13. Each party hereto shall have free access to, and right 
to make extract copies of ail books and records received or 
retained by the other party hereunder which are relevant to this 
Agreement. 
14. Seller covenants that pending the closing: 
a. Its business will be carried on only in the 
ordinary course. 
b. No contract or commitment will be enter^d^ftito by 
or on behalf of Seller extending beyond August JrT 1995, except 
ordinary commitments for cruises, tours and airline tickets. 
c. Except as Buyer may otherwise request, and without 
making any commitment on its behalf, Seller will utilize its best 
efforts to keep its business organization intact; to keep 
available to Buyer the services of its present employees; and to 
preserve for Buyer the good will of the suppliers and customers of 
Seller's and the good will of others with which Seller has 
business relations• 
d. Seller will duly comply with the laws of Utah 
(including without limitation laws on bulk sales), and with all 
such other applicable laws as may be required for the valid and 
effective consummation of the sale provided for in this Agreement. 
15. Seller covenants that all deposits for cruise and tour 
bookings have been paid over to the cruise line or tour operator. 
Any deposits not having been paid over shall be delivered to 
Buyer. On confirmation by Buyer that all cruise and tour deposits 
have been paid to the cruise lines, tour operators or received by 
Buyer, Buyer assumes all responsibility for the cruise and tour 
booking transferred to Buyer. 
16. Seller grants complete exclusivity to Buyer in utili2ing 
the aforementioned clients' lists, business files, etc. And 
further, Seller covenants that it nor Lee Fiet shall not at any 
time, whether alone, jointly or as an agent for another, directly 
solicit the persons previously doing business with Aristocrat 
travel to do business with another travel office. However, said 
covenant shall not prohibit or prevent Seller from doing business 
with former clients of Aristocrat Travel, who without solicitation 
by Seller, desire to continue a travel business relationship with 
Seller. Seller is covenant not to compete extends only to the 
solicitation by direct contact, written or verbal, to former 
L ents 01 Aristocrat Travel. This covenant does not apply to 
ordinary and typical advertising commonly use in a travel agency 
business which may attract former clients of Aristocrat Travel. 
Further, Seller covenants not to set up, make or encourage ar*y 
opposition to the trade or business to be carried on by Buyer as a 
result of this Buyer's purchase of assets. 
17. Each party hereto shall pay its own expenses incident to 
preparation for carrying this Agreement into effect and 
consummating said transactions whether or not the transactions 
contemplated hereby are consummated. 
18. This Agreement shall be assignable by Seller or Buyer 
with written consent of the non-assigning party. 
19. All the terms of this Agreement shall be binding upon, 
and inure to the benefit of, and be enforceable by the successors 
of the parties hereto. 
20. This Agreement is being delivered, and is intended to be 
performed in the State of Utah, and shall be construed and 
enforced in accordance with the laws of such state. 
21. Any notice, request, instruction or other document to be 
given hereunder by either party hereto, to the other, shall be in 
writing and delivered personally or sent by registered mail, 
postage prepaid. 
22. This Agreement may be executed simultaneously in two or 
more counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, but 
all of which together shall constitute one and the same 
instrument. 
23. This instrument contains the entire agreement between 
the parties hereto with respect to the transactions contemplated 
herein. The parties hereto may, by mutual agreement, in writing, 
(i) extend the time for the performance of any of the obligations 
of the parties hereto, (ii) waive; any inaccuracies in the 
warranties and representations contained in this Agreement, and 
(iii) waive compliance with any of the covenants contained herein 
and so waive performance of any of the obligations of the parties 
hereto. Any such agreement on the part of the Seller, for any 
such extension or waiver, shall be validly and sufficiently 
authorized for the purposes of this Agreement, if authorized or 
ratified by the Board of Directors or Executive Committee of 
Seller and Buyer. 
24. Any dispute between the parties regarding the terms and 
conditions of this Agreement shall be first submitted to mediation 
prior to the commencement of any litigation to enforce the terms 
and conditions of this agreement. In the event litigation is 
necessary to enforce the obligations of each party, the losing 
-8-
party agrees to pay all reasonable attorney's fees and costs 
incurred in enforcing this Agreement. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF", the parties have caused this Agreement to 
be du«i.y executed. 
BUYER: SELLER: 
CONTINENTAL TRAVEL, L.L.C. ARISTOCRAT TRAVEL SERVICES, INC. 
^^&r-L^ BY: ^ ^ ^ ^ f ; ? < r?-i-^ 





LETTERS FOR SIGN (3 BOXES) 
VACUUM 
IBM TYPEWRITERS (3) 
ZENITH STEREO 
CALCULATORS (6) 
PREMIER PHONE SYSTEM 
PAYMASTER CHECK PROTECTOR 
PITNEY/BOWES SCALE UPS 
ICOTT/SABRE COMPUTER TERMINALS (4) 
SHAW/WALKER EXECUTIVE DESK (1) 
7 FT. SECRETARIAL STEEL DESK (1) 
6 FT. SECRETARIAL STEEL DESK (3) 
SHAW/WALKER CREDENZAS (3) 
GRAY STEEL FIRE PROOF FILE CABINET 
ANDERSON/HICKERING 4-DRAWER FILE CABINET (2) 
OFFICE HIGH EXECUTIVE CHAIR 
SHAW/WALKER STENO CHAIRS (4) 
CHROME UNITED SIDE CHAIRS (6) 
CHROME SHAW/WALKER SWIVEL SIDE CHAIR (4) 
INTERIOR WIRING 
SOLID OAK BROCHURE RACKS (3) (SMALL) 
SOLID OAK BROCHURE RACKS (2) LARGE 
PLASTIC BROCHURE RACKS (3) 
DIVIDER OFFICE 
STEEL CABINETS (2) 
MICON MULTI PLEXOR MODEM 
TEL TREND 
ACRYLIC/GLASS CHAIR MATTS (6) 
MINOLTA 320 COPIER 
STORAGE TABLES (2) 
STORAGE SHELVING (6) 
CLOCKS (2) (1 WOOD) 
COMPUTER DESK AND HUTCH 
COMPUTER CHAIR 
TYPEWRITER STAND 
BRASS POTS AND PLANTS MISC. 
RICOH FAX 20 E 
SUPPLY CABINET - STEEL MASTER 30 DRAWER CT140 
ENVELOPES/STATIONERY 
TICKET JACKETS, MISC. 
PETTY CASH BOX/TICKET STEEL FILE BOX 
VIDEO LIBRARY (OVER 100) 
EXHIBIT "A" 
Page 2 
ITINERARY STOCK 2 CASES 
MISC. OFFICE SUPPLIES 
EQUITY IN AT t T COMPUTER TERMINALS 
FLIGHT BAGS 310 
ACCOUNTING COMPUTER 
PRINTER 
LEATHER OFFICE SIDE CHAIRS (2) 
ARISTOCRAT T-SHIRTS 1,000 
COMPUTER LEASE 36 MONTHS PREPAID IF VOLUME STAYS UP 
ALL TELEPHONE NUMBERS 
ALL EQUIPMENT OF SALT LAKE LOCATION (IF RECOVERED FROM COHENS) 




GROUP PASSENGER LIST 
SEAWARD 26 NOV 95 































29.FINCH.J ALAN C 
30.FINCH.DIANE 
TOUR CONDUCTOR 
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98.CODY.KIM MR G 2205.00DISCOVER 2260.00 
99.CODY.CONNIE SLC 2765.00 505-
Addendum N 
C O N T I N E N T A L . T R A V E L L . C . 
28 E a s t : i 0 0 Sc :h, S i t e 1 1 2 
S a l t a k e Ci i.j UT 5 
laephone: (801)484-9800 Itiecopier: ( 80^ 484-9821 
September 2*7. 1995 
TO: L. LEE FIET 
FROM: LEW W. I SON 
RE: Concerns OVP 
Dear Sir, 
We recently concluded an agreement for the sale of the 
business i terest and assets oi Aristocrat Travel of Bountiful. 
In return for various peri rmances on your part, I was to remit 
sums of monies in payment for the conveyance by you of said 
business interest and assets. As- you know, this sale has been 
discussed by us for some time, and one of the big reasons why it 
has taken so long to consummate in any form at all is that my 
attempts to reach an agreement with you that included back-out 
clauses and clauses allowing me to see the books of your company 
and familiarize myself with your operations were thwarted by you 
at every turn. In short, you consistently refused to give me any 
advance information, financial or otherwise, concerning the 
general viability of your agency( s) . I now see why thi is. 
To date, you have not performed, or have misled me in this 
agreement in a number of ways: 
( 1) Approximately 80% of the office equipment and supplies 
you listed on Schedule "A" either does not exist or cannot 
be located; 
( 2) You previously signed over at least one of your 
exterior signs to American Towers, whereas the agreement 
acknowledges the existence of the signs and my right to 
them, and your conveyance of the rights to them, to me; 
( 3) You have falsified various bookings, making it appear 
on the surface that there was more business than there 
really was; 
( 4) You have apparently personally taken possession and 
disposed of approximately $13,000.00 in deposits made by 126 
'ITER TO L. LEE FIET RE: CONCERNS OVER CONTRACT PftGE 1 
r contract. 
^ 31 
people who you booked on an NCL cruise departing on November 
26, 1995; that cruise is now in jeopardy, and I have been 
forced to tie up my own funds to guarantee their passage. 
There are other things also. I want you to know, and put 
you on formal notice that I do not intend to perform on any more 
payments on the contract that we entered into as I consider that 
you are guilty of negligent misrepresentation, trespass upon the 
chattels of your customers, the conversion of those chattels, 
theft by deception, and fraud; furthermore, as to your conversion 
of other peoples' assets, you have further left me holding the 
bag as it were, to try to make your theft of their monies right, 
if I could, thus threatening me with a loss of goodwill with 
these customers as well as my own. As such, I have no doubt that 
any court of competent jurisdiction will consider this contract 
null and void ab initio, and will award me damages for the 
trouble I have gone to over this whole matter. 
Finally, I warn you that unless this matter is resolved to 
my satisfaction, I intend not only to pursue any and all civil 
remedies at my disposal, but to refer your name to the 
appropriate county attorney( s) for investigation prior to 
returning an indictment against you for violations of the theft 
by deception statutes and RICO violations. 
I urge you to make this right with me with all due haste. 
Lew w. I son, President, 
Continental Travel L. C. 
LETTER TO L. LEE FIET RE: CONCERNS OVER CONTRACT PAGE 2 
Addendum 0 
CONTINENTAL TRAVEL 
28 Emt 2100 Jkwth »112.S«ltL»k»CJt)r, Utah B41U 
(t(H)U44ftO0 FAX(M1}«e4-M21 
11 OCTOBER 1995 
DEAR CRUISE MEMBER, 
WELCOME ABOARD. YOU ARE SCHEDULED TO EMBARK ON THE MS SEAWARD 
FROM THE PORT OF SAN JUAN, NOVEMBER 26,1dt5, FOR A SEVEN DAY CRUISE, 
SAILING TO THE EXCITING PORTS OF ARUBA, CURACAO.TORTOLA, AND ST THOMAS. 
IN CONFIRMING YOUR CRUISE WITH NORWEGIAN CRUISE UNES TODAY, I WAS 
INFORMED THA- THE ITINERARY IS ANTICIPATED TO BE AS OUTLINED, THERe WILL 
BE FERRY SERVICE FROM TORTOLA TO VIRGIN GORDA AND FROM ST THOMAS TO ST 
JOHN . GIVEN THIS YEAR'S WEATHER I WILL LET YOU KNOW IF ANY CHANGES OCCUR 
BETWEEN NOW AND YOUR SAILING DATE. 
AS YOU ARE AWARE, ARISTOCRAT TRAVEL IS OUT OF BUSINESS. ALL 
CONTRACTS. QUOTES, AND COMMITMENTS OF ARISTOCRAT TRAVEL ARE NULL AND 
VOID. SOME OF THE MONIES THAT WERE PAID TC^ARISTOCRAT TRAVEL WERE NOT 
FgjWARDED_TQNQRWFGtAN CRUI8E I tNES. SOMj^OFTHE PRICES QUOTEOTO YOU 
J3YARJSIOCRAT TRAVEL WERE NOT ASSU_RATE1___ 
NORWEGIAN CRUISE UNES WILL NOT RELEASE ANY CRUISE DOCUMENTS TO 
CONTINENTAL TRAVEL UNTIL AU. FUNOS OUE NORWEGIAN CRUISE UNES HAVEBEEN 
RECIEVED BY NORWEGIAN CRUI8E UNES. CURRENTLY A DEFICIT OF SA30^ IS 
DUE 20 OCTOBER. 1*05, IN OROER TO COMPLETE PAYMENT OF THE CRUISE AND 
SECURE DOCUMENTS FOR YOUR CABIN. CANCELLATION PENALTIES DO APPLY, 
CURRENTLY 4M.00 PER CABIN, SHOULD YOU CHOOSE TO NOT TRAVEL AS 
SCHEDULEO. REFUNDS WOULD BE AMOUNT THAT YOU HAVE PAID LESS ANY 
DEFICITS AND PENALTIES. 
I AM WORKING WITH NCL TO 8EE IF ANY DISCOUNTS CAN BE FOUND TO BE 
APPUED TO THIS GROUP. BETSY AND I DO PLAN TO BE WITH YOU ABOARD SHIP TO 
HELP YOU IN ANY WAY WE CAN TO MAKE THIS AN ENJOYABLE CRUISE FOR YOU. WE 





SENT BY: 1 0 - 2 4 - 9 5 ;10:14AM ; SC4M LAK FIUVH LTAH ATTY GEN/FBEU;* S 
C O N T I N E N T A L T R A V E L L . C . 
28 East 2100 South, Suite 112 
Salt Lake City UT 84115 
Telephone: ( 801)484-9800 Telecopier: ( SOI) 484-4891 
October 17, 199 5 
TO: All persons who have booked cruise spacp with Aristocrat 
Travel of Bountiful on NCL for the following date: 
November 26/ 19 94 
FROM: LEW W. ISON, President Continental Travel L. C. 
RE: Important notice. 
You will please take notice, you and each of you, of the 
following important information: 
1) on 21 AUG 1995 Continental Travel entered into an 
agreement with L. Lee Fiet of Aristocrat Travel of 
Bountiful to purchase the business interest of 
Aristocrat, which consisted primarily of a client list, 
some bookings, and a few pieces of furniture. 
2) Pursuant to this agreement/ continental was to 
assume no liability for any outstanding obligations 
owed oy Aristocrat, including remittances to 
Fiet/Aristocrat by travelers on the cruises leaving on 
the above-referenced dates. 
3) Continental has not at any tim« purchased any 
shares of stock in Aristocrat, and has never had an 
ownership interest in said Company of any kind. 
4) It has become apparent to us that Fiet/Aristocrat 
has not remitted the funds paid by some of tho 
travelers on the cruises aforementioned, to NCL. As it 
stands right now, there is a significant shortage whicn 
needs to be made up. If this shortage Is not made up, 
NCL will cancel the cruise for the entire group and no 
one will go, regardless of whether they have paid the 
full fare or not. 
5) continental considers also that Fiet/Aristocrat 
has defaulted on the provisions of the Agreement 
..^ ** uwc A^ teenien'c
 # oetween itself and 
Fiet/ Aristocrat for non-pertormance as well as other 
tortious acts which are the subject of an upcoming 
legal action aqainst said company/individual, 
6) Having rescinded the Agreement wiin Aristocrat, 
Continental Will not assume liability for Aristocrat' s 
actions in failing to remit the monies for said cruis*, 
and cannot assist the group in resolving the problem; 
Continental, in so saying, points out the following: 
(a; The problem is susceptible of resolution, 
were continental to be authorized by the various 
groups to step in and resolve the Situation; 
(b) Continental cannot at this tiias render any 
assistance with this problem, other than 
identifying the essence of the problem and 
conveying this informa-cion as timely as possible 
to the various meinbers of the groups 
aforementioned, due to the possibility of a false 
presumption being created that Continental has 
liability for the acts of Aristocrat, which it 
does not; 
( c) With regard to the resolution of the problem, 
were continental to be formally engaged and 
commissioned by the various groups aforementioned, 
to solve this problem, these groups would have to 
accede to Continental' s explicit direction, with 
no exceptions, to solve the problem. 
Again: Continental wants to make clear that, pursuant to the 
foregoing information it assumes no liability for the actions of 
Fiet/Aristocrat in not remitting said funds to NCL; and further, 
it does not consider it reasonable or legally viable for those so 
discomfited by Aristocrat to look to Continental to make good on 
behalf of Aristocrat something that is entirely \riStocrat' s 
problem and liability. Continental considers that all those who 
have allegedly received legal advica to the contrary . and who 
argue that Continental should make good another Aristocrat's 
liabilities, whether incurred by that company through simple 
negligence or purposeful defalcation, should carefully consider 
the wisdom of such a course. While Continental is concerned 
about the situation from a standpoint of wanting to help, it ha* 
no intention of assuming any liability of any other company in 
this, or any other matter; however, if the groups want to enter 
into a separate agreement with Continental to * take over" the 
situation, and are willing to be bound by Continental' s handling 
of the problem, the situation can likely be resolved. 
LETTER RE: NCL CRUISES CONTRACTED KITH ARISTOCRAT PAGE 2 
ISon# President, 
Continental Travel L. c. 
LWl/kob 
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of Lew Ison : FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
dba Continental Ti ivel L.L.C. : OF LAW AND RECOMMENDED ORDER 
Appearances: 
Mark E. Kleinfield for the Division of Consumer Pi *on 
Lew Ison for Respondent 
By the Administrative Law Judge: 
Pursuant to a November 16, 1995 notice, a November 20, 1995 hearing was 
conducted in the above-entitled proceeding before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law 
Judge for the Department of Commerce. Thereafter, evidence was presented and argument 
offered as to an October 30, 1995 citation issued to Respondent by the Division. 
The Administrative Law Judge entered a Recommended Order at the conclusion of the 
hearing, the terms of which are restated as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Aristocrat Travel Services, Inc. (hereinafter, Aristocrat) is a corporation 
registered to do business in this state. Lee Fiet was the president of that entity from 1981 to 
1995. Mr. Fiet was not regularly involved in Aristocrat's daily operations subsequent to 
January 1995. Respondent Lew Ison is the president of Continental Travel (hereinafter, 
Continental), a limited liability company doing business in this state. 
2. Pursuant to an August 21, 1995 purchase agreement, Continental agreed to buy 
certain assets of Aristocrat for $60,000, which included cruise and tour bookings with 
scheduled departures after August 21, 1995. The agreement provided for an initial payment 
$10,000 to Aristocrat. The balance was to be paid from both a percentage of 
commissions on cruise groups booked through Aristocrat which were scheduled to sail 
from November 1995 through January 1996 and a percentage of Aristocrat's net profits from 
office locations. 
3. The August 21, 1995 purchase agreement provides that Aristocrat "covenants that 
all deposits for cruise and tour bookings have been paid over to the cruise line or tour 
operator" and that any deposits "not having been paid over shall be delivered" to 
Continental. The agreement further provides that, on confirmation by Continental that "all 
cruise and tour deposits have been paid to the cruise lines, tour operators or received" by 
Continental, the latter (Continental) "assumes all responsibility for the cruise and tour 
booking transferred" to that company. 
4. Aristocrat-through Mr. Fiet—had reserved sixty-six cabins on a November 26, 
1995 cruise booking with Norwegian Cruise Lines. A $25 deposit per person for double 
occupancy on each cabin was due from Aristocrat to hold each cabin. That payment was to 
be made between 30-60 days from Aristocrat's contract with Norwegian Cruise Lines. An 
additional $175 per person was due 120 days prior to the sailing date. The final payment 
was due 60 days prior to the sailing date. 
5. Payments by cash or check could be made by passengers to Aristocrat and those 
monies were to then be paid by Aristocrat to Norwegian Cruise Lines. Alternatively, 
passengers could make credit card payments directly to Norwegian Cruise Lines. This 
record does not reflect the total passengers booked by Aristocrat for the November 26, 1995 
cruise, the total funds received by Aristocrat from those passengers or an individualized 
accounting of funds received by Aristocrat from any given passenger. Prior to August 21, 
1995, Aristocrat had remitted a total of $12,597 to Norwegian Cruise Lines for the 
November 26, 1995 cruise. Aristocrat issued the final billing statement to passengers for 
that cruise on or about August 15, 1995. Such funds were to be paid to either Aristocrat or 
Norwegian Cruise Lines no later than September 26, 1995. 
6. Prior to August 21, 1995, Mr. Fiet became aware that insufficient funds had been 
paid to Norwegian Cruise Lines to hold the cabins which Aristocrat had initially reserved for 
the November 26, 1995 cruise. There is no sufficient evidence to enter any finding as to the 
amount of that deficit or the difference between the monies paid to Aristocrat from those 
passengers scheduled to depart on the November 26, 1995 cruise and the funds remitted by 
2 
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Aristocrat to Norwegian Cruise Lines in that regard. Based on the credible evidence 
presented, it appears funds in e ess of $10,000 were diverted prior to Au t 21, 1995 and 
were not properly credited to c lin passengers booked on the November 1995 cruise. 
7 Respondent review :>ome of Aristocrat's business records, b prior and 
subsequent to August 21, 1995. Respondent contacted Mr. Fiet in late September 1995 after 
Continental ha< become av -e of the above-dec ;bed def it. Based on the more credible 
evidence prese \ Continental had not been pr ied all /f Aristocrat's business records as 
to readily document those funds which Aristocrat had received from the passengers in 
question. Mr. Fiet was not certain as to whatever funds were received by Aristocrat and 
then paid u Norwegian Cruise Lines as of Augus' 21, 1995. Moreover, it appears the 
passenger list for the November 26, 1995 cruise was not complete. 
8. The August 21, 1995 purchase agreement between Aristocrat and Continental 
does not provide either when or the manner by which Continental was to provide 
confirmation to Aristocrat regarding the status of cruise and tour deposits as to then transfer 
responsibility for those bookings to Continental. Based on the substantial and credible 
evidence presented and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, Continental did not 
provide any confirmation to Aristocrat as to assume responsibility for the cruise and tour 
bookings in question. 
9. On or about August 21, 1995, Continental had paid 57,000 of the initial $10,000 
due to Aristocrat. Continental issued a $3,000 check to Aristocrat on September 1, 1995. 
However, Continental subsequently stopped payment on that check and notified Aristocrat of 
an intent to rescind the August 21, 1995 purchase agreement. This record does not reflect 
the exact date or dates that Continental stopped payment on the $3,000 check and notified 
Aristocrat of any intent to rescind the purchase agreement. 
10. On or about October 11, 1995, Respondent provided written notice to those 
passengers of record for the November 26, 1995 cruise that Aristocrat "is out of business" 
and that "contracts, quotes, and commitments" of Aristocrat are "null and void". 
Respondent further represented that some monies paid to Aristocrat "were not forwarded to 
Norwegian Cruise Lines" and that some of the prices quoted by Aristocrat "were not 
accurate". Respondent thus informed those passengers as to the amount of the deficit 
3 
payment due by October 20, 1995 to "complete payment of the cruise and secure documents 
for your cabin". Respondent also provided notice that cancellation penalties of $450 per 
cabin would apply. 
11. Commencing mid-October 1995, the Division received eight (8) complaints from 
various passengers initially scheduled to depart on the November 26, 1995 cruise. This 
record does not reflect whether-and in whatever manner—those complaints may have been 
subsequently resolved. However, Continental provided written notice to Norwegian Cruise 
Lines on or about October 25, 1995 that sixteen passengers were to be released from the 
group booking on the November 26, 1995 cruise. Norwegian Cruise Lines charged 
cancellation fees for various passengers and Continental paid a total of $6,800 to Norwegian 
Cruise Lines in cancellation fees for seventeen passengers. 
12. The Division also received complaints from Francis and Donna Hansen 
(hereinafter, the Hansens) and Dennis and Milly Daniels (hereinafter, the Daniels) regarding 
their status for the January 14, 1996 cruise. The Hansens had paid a total of $649 to 
Aristocrat between April 28, 1995 and May 19, 1995. This record does not reflect the total 
monies which the Daniels had paid to Aristocrat. However, those funds were paid sometime 
in April or May 1995. Based on the credible evidence presented, neither the Hansens nor 
the Daniels were on the passenger list maintained by Norwegian Cruise Lines for the January 
14, 1996 cruise. Further, Norwegian Cruise Lines had no record of any funds received from 
Aristocrat which represented payments made to Aristocrat by the Hansens and the Daniels. 
13. Based on the reasonable inferences from the credible evidence presented, the 
Hansens and the Daniels requested a full refund from Continental on or about October 9, 
1995. Both the Hansens and the Daniels also informed Continental that they had taken action 
to stop payment on the credit card draft which they had issued-payable to Norwegian Cruise 
Lines-for the balance on the cruise which was due September 29, 1995. Respondent advised 
the Hansens and the Daniels to directly contact Norwegian Cruise Lines and also referred 
then to Mr. Fiet or his attorney. The Hansens and the Daniels have not received any refund 
of the monies which they paid to Aristocrat. 
14. The Division did not review Aristocrat's bank records, the source of any payment 
made by Aristocrat to Norwegian Cruise Lines or the method of payment by any passenger 
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in question. Any records maintained by Norwegian Cruise Lines were not available for 
Division review. This record does not reflect -hatevei payments were made by passengers 
after Aucjst 21, 1995 as to either the November 26, 1995 or January 14, 1996 cruises. This 
record does also not reflect whether payments were received from those passengers after 
August 21, 1995 by both Respondent and Norwegian Cruise Lines. This record reflects no 
substantial evidence as to whatever funds~if any-Respondent received subsequent to August 
21, 1995. There is no evidence Respondent received any funds from either the Hansens or 
the Daniels as to the January 14, 1996 cruise. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Division contends Respondent received payments from passengers who were 
booked on either the November 26, 1995 or January 14, 1996 cruises, yet failed to furnish 
the cruises in question. The Division also asserts Respondent represented that a sixty day 
cancellation policy existed, yet Respondent refused to refund monies paid by passengers who 
had timely requested a refund. The Division thus argues Respondent violated the Consumer 
Sales Practices Act in both of those instances as to each of the ten complainants. The 
Division seeks entry of a $1,000 fine for each violation, which thus totals $20,000. The 
Division also seeks entry of a cease and desist order. 
U.C.A. §13-11-4(2) provides: 
. . . a supplier commits a deceptive act or practice if the supplier 
knowingly or intentionally: 
(j) indicates that a consumer transaction involves or does not 
involve a warranty, a disclaimer of warranties, particular warranty 
terms, or other rights, remedies, or obligations, if the representation 
is false; 
(1) after receipt of payment for goods or services, fails to ship 
the goods or furnish the services within the time advertised or 
otherwise represented . . . unless within the applicable time period 
the supplier provides the buyer with the option to either cancel the 
sales agreement and receive a refund of all previous payments to the 
supplier . . . . 
§13-11-3(6) defines supplier as: 
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. . . a seller, lessor, assignor, offeror, broker, or other person who 
regularly solicits, engages in, or enforces consumer 
transactions, whether or not he deals directly with the consumer. 
There is a lack of substantial evidence to find and conclude Respondent violated either of the 
above-quoted statutes. Specifically, Respondent made no misrepresentation to any passenger 
or ever disputed whether a refund was available from Aristocrat or Norwegian Cruise Lines. 
Rather, the crux of the issue is whether any refund of monies paid to Aristocrat was to be 
made by Aristocrat or Continental. 
Significantly, Respondent never provided confirmation to Aristocrat that a full and 
accurate accounting of tour and cruise deposits existed as to then be held responsible for 
those bookings. Moreover, it is undisputed that payments from the Hansens and the Daniels 
were made to Aristocrat, yet never properly deposited with Norwegian Cruise Lines on 
behalf of those passengers. Absent confirmation by Respondent to Aristocrat, as required in 
the August 21, 1995 purchase agreement, the Court concludes Aristocrat had the initial and 
continuing responsibility to provide any refund as to monies previously paid by any 
passenger to Aristocrat. 
Further, there is no substantial evidence Respondent received payment from any 
passenger for either cruise and then failed to furnish the contractual services to be provided 
for any such passenger. The Court reiterates that payments from the Hansens and the 
Daniels were made to Aristocrat. The Court also notes the various methods of payment, 
whereby passengers could either pay Aristocrat or-presumably-Respondent by cash or check 
or make payment to Norwegian Cruise Lines directly by credit card. This record contains no 
substantial evidence to find Respondent received monies from any passenger after August 21, 
1995. 
Unfortunately, payments made to Aristocrat by various passengers prior to August 21, 
1995 were diverted and not properly credited to those passengers. This record does not 
establish by whom or the manner in which those funds were diverted. Respondent took 
some remedial action after Continental became aware that payments made by certain 
passengers to Aristocrat had not been properly credited. However, there is simply no 
substantial evidence Respondent received payments from any passengers and subsequently 
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refused to furnish those passengers with services relating to their bookings on either of the 
two cruises under review. 
The Division acknowledges that Aristocrat bears some responsibility for what occurred. 
Nevertheless, the Division urges Respondent was legally obligated to perform pursuant to the 
August 21, 1995 agreement and Respondent thus became responsible for the two cruises in 
question. The Division also contends Respondent should have discovered the monetary 
shortfall at an earlier stage of his review of Aristocrat's business records and Respondent's 
delay in so doing prejudiced certain consumers who were then unable to obtain refunds. 
Notwithstanding the Division's attempt to assist the consumers in question by directing its 
efforts toward the only financially solvent entity which might rectify this situation, no proper 
factual or legal basis exists to find and conclude Respondent violated either of the above-
quoted statutory provisions or the relief sought by the Division may be properly entered in 
this proceeding. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the October 30, 1995 citation be dismissed, 
inasmuch as no factual and legal basis exists to enter any sanction against Respondent in this 
proceeding. 
I hereby certify that on the ££> day of January, 1996, the foregoing Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order were submitted to Francine A. Giani, 
Director, Division of Consumer Protection for her review and action. 
J/ Jteven Eklhtnd 
linistrative Law Judge 
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